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Abstract—We analyze the exact exponential decay rate of the
expected amount of information leaked to the wiretapper in
Wyner’s wiretap channel setting using wiretap channel codes
constructed from both i.i.d. and constant-composition random
codes. Our analysis for those sampled from i.i.d. random coding
ensemble shows that the previously-known achievable secrecy
exponent using this ensemble is indeed the exact exponent for
an average code in the ensemble. Furthermore, our analysis on
wiretap channel codes constructed from the ensemble of constant-
composition random codes leads to an exponent which, in
addition to being the exact exponent for an average code, is larger
than the achievable secrecy exponent that has been established so
far in the literature for this ensemble (which in turn was known
to be smaller than that achievable by wiretap channel codes
sampled from i.i.d. random coding ensemble). We show examples
where the exact secrecy exponent for the wiretap channel codes
constructed from random constant-composition codes is larger
than that of those constructed from i.i.d. random codes and
examples where the exact secrecy exponent for the wiretap
channel codes constructed from i.i.d. random codes is larger
than that of those constructed from constant-composition random
codes. We, hence, conclude that, unlike the error correction
problem, there is no general ordering between the two random
coding ensembles in terms of their secrecy exponent.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, Channel resolvability, Secrecy
exponent, Resolvability exponent
I. INTRODUCTION
THE problem of communication in presence of an eaves-dropper wiretapping the signals sent to the legitimate
receiver (see Figure 1) was first studied by Wyner [1] and
later, in a broader context, by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], where
it was shown (among other results) that as long as the
eavesdropper’s channel is weaker than legitimate receiver’s
channel, reliable and secure communication at positive rates
is feasible. More precisely, it was shown that, given any
distribution on the common input alphabet of the channels,
PX , for which the mutual information developed across the
legitimate receiver’s channel is higher than that developed
across the wiretapper’s channel, that is, I(X ;Y ) > I(X ;Z),
with (X,Y, Z) ∼ PX(x)WM(y|x)WE(z|x) (where X , Y ,
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and Z represent the common input, legitimate receiver’s
channel output, and wiretapper’s channel output, respectively),
as long as the secret message rate Rs , 1n log |Sn| is below
I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z) there exists a sequence of coding schemes
(indexed by the block-length n) using which
lim
n→∞
max
s∈Sn
Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S|S = s} = 0, (1a)
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(S;Zn) = 0. (1b)
In the above, S represents the secret message taking values
in the message set Sn, sˆML(Y n) is the maximum-likelihood
(ML) estimation of the sent message given the output sequence
of the legitimate receiver’s channel and Zn represents the
output sequence of the wiretapper’s channel (see Figure 1).
Classical codes for the wiretap channel are constructed by
associating each message with a code that operates at a rate R
just below the mutual information developed across the eaves-
dropper’s channel. To communicate a message, the stochastic
encoder of Alice picks a codeword uniformly at random
from the code associated to that message and transmits it via
consecutive uses of the channel [1]–[3]. Such constructions,
known as capacity-based constructions (with a slight abuse of
terminology) [4], will guarantee that the normalized amount
of information that Eve learns about the secret message by
observing her channel output signal, 1nI(S;Z
n), will be arbi-
trarily small, provided that the block-length n is sufficiently
large. Recently, resolvability-based constructions for wiretap
channel codes, namely, those associating each message with a
code operating at a rate just above the mutual information of
the wiretapper’s channel was shown to be more powerful than
the capacity-based constructions to prove achievability results.
Indeed, in [5] it was shown that such constructions can be used
to easily show that the unnormalized amount of information
Eve learns about the secret message, I(S;Zn), vanishes as the
block-length increases, namely to establish strong secrecy (a
notion first introduced by Maurer and Wolf [6]). In particular,
when resolvability-based wiretap channel codes are employed
over stationary memoryless wiretap channels the amount of
information Eve learns about the secret message vanishes
exponentially fast in the block-length. Thus, it is natural to
study the rate of this exponential decay.
Definition 1. Given the rate pair (Rs, R) and a pair of
stationary memoryless channels (WM,WE), a number η is
an achievable secrecy exponent if there exists a sequence of
coding schemes of block-length n and secret message rate Rs,
each message associated with a sub-code of rate R (i.e., the
encoder needs access to a random number generator of rate R)
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Fig. 1. Wiretap Channel
that are reliable for communication over WM and guarantee
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log I(S;Zn) ≥ η. (2)
Hayashi [7] was the first to derive a lower bound to the
achievable secrecy exponents using the resolvability-based
construction of wiretap channel codes from i.i.d. random
codes. He, later on, showed that this lower bound can be
improved if, on top of a random code sampled from i.i.d. ran-
dom coding ensemble, a random hash function is used in the
construction of the encoder–decoder pair [8]. This technique is
known as privacy amplification. More recently, it was shown
(see special cases of [9, Theorem 2], [10, Theorem 3.1], or the
proof given in [11]) that privacy amplification is unnecessary
and the exponent derived in [8] lower-bounds the exponential
decay rate of the ensemble average of the information leaked
to Eve when a wiretap channel code constructed from the
ensemble of i.i.d. random codes is used for communication.
To study the universally achievable (in the sense defined
in [12]) secrecy exponents, constructing codes for wiretap
channel from the ensemble of random constant-composition
codes is investigated in [13]. A lower bound to the achievable
secrecy exponent when this class of wiretap channel codes
are used in conjunction with privacy amplification is derived
in [13] which is smaller than the lower bound of [8] on the
achievable secrecy exponent using i.i.d. random codes.
A. Contribution and Paper Outline
In this paper we first show that the exponent derived via the
method of [11] (which was first established in [8]) is indeed
the exact secrecy exponent for an average code in the ensemble
and secondly extend the analysis of [11] to the ensemble
of constant-composition random codes (see Theorem 4 and
its corollary). This, in particular, implies that the previously-
known lower bound to the achievable secrecy exponent using
wiretap channel codes constructed from i.i.d. random coding
ensemble characterizes the exact exponential decay rate of the
average amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper.
Moreover, it turns out that the exact secrecy exponent for the
wiretap channel codes constructed from constant-composition
random codes is larger than the lower bound derived in [13]
and there are examples where this dominance is strict. Further,
examples show that in general there is no ordering between
the secrecy exponents of the ensembles of i.i.d. and constant-
composition codes. In other words, for some channels the
i.i.d. ensemble yields a better secrecy exponent, whereas in
the others, the constant-composition ensemble prevails (see
Section IV-B).
The analysis of [11] is based on pure random coding
arguments (no privacy amplification is used) and is carried
out by lower-bounding the achievable resolvability exponents
(see Definition 5) using random codes. We will show, in this
work, that this method not only proves the achievability of
the exponent, but also, using very similar steps, establishes its
exactness (see Definition 6). Moreover, a simple observation
shows that the exact resolvability exponent equals the exact
secrecy exponent for an ensemble (see Theorem 1), which in
turn, allows us to conclude that the exponent derived through
this method is the exact secrecy exponent as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After
setting our notation conventions in Section II, we prove the
equivalence of secrecy and resolvability exponents in Sec-
tion III and reduce the analysis of the exact secrecy exponent
for an ensemble to that of the exact resolvability exponent.
We present our main result on exact secrecy exponents in
Section IV, argue that the exact secrecy exponent for the
ensemble of constant-composition random codes is larger
than the lower bound derived in [13], and give numerical
examples comparing the exponents for two ensembles of
i.i.d. and constant-composition random codes. Our main result
is proved in Section V. To streamline the presentation, we
relegate the straightforward but tedious parts of the proof to
the appendices.
B. Related Work
In addition to those cited above, [14] also presents a simple
achievability proof for channel resolvability. Based on this
proof the authors, in their subsequent work [15], establish
strong secrecy for wiretap channel using resolvability-based
constructions for wiretap channel codes. The performance of
a code for the wiretap channel is measured via two figures of
merit, namely, the error probability and information leakage,
both of which decay exponentially in block-length when a
wiretap channel code sampled from the ensemble of random
codes is employed on stationary memoryless channels (as we
will also discuss in Theorem 2). The trade-off between secrecy
and error exponents (as well as other generalizations of the
model) is studied in [16].
Another important problem, in the realm of information-
theoretic secrecy, is secret key agreement [17], [18]. The
secrecy exponents related to this model are studied in [8],
[16], [19], [20] and, in particular, in [19], [20] shown to be
exact.
II. NOTATION
We use uppercase letters (like X) to denote a random
variable and the corresponding lowercase version (x) for a
realization of that random variable. The same convention
applies to vectors, i.e., xn = (x1, . . . , xn) denotes a realization
3of the random vector Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn). We denote finite
sets by script-style uppercase letters like A. The cardinality of
the set A is denoted by |A|.
We write f(n) ≤˙ g(n) if there exists a function p(n) such
that lim supn→∞ 1n log(p(n)) = 0 and f(n) ≤ p(n)g(n). As
noted in [21, p. 2507], when f(n) and g(n) depend on other
variables than n it is understood that p(n) can only depend on
the fixed parameters of the problem such as channel transition
probabilities, the cardinality of its input and output alphabet,
and its input distribution and not the other parameters f and
g may depend on.1 f(n) .= g(n) means f(n) ≤˙ g(n) and
g(n) ≤˙ f(n). For a ∈ R, [a]+ , max{a, 0} denotes positive
clipping.
We denote the set of distributions on alphabet X as
P(X ). If P ∈ P(X ), Pn ∈ P(Xn) denotes the prod-
uct distribution Pn(xn) ,
∏n
i=1 P (xi) (where xn denotes
the n-dimensional vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn). Likewise, if
V : X → Y is a conditional distribution (that is, ∀x ∈ X ,
V (·|x) ∈ P(Y)), V n : Xn → Yn denotes the conditional
distribution V n(yn|xn) =
∏n
i=1 V (yi|xi). For a joint distri-
bution Q ∈ P(X × Y), QX (respectively QY ) denotes its x-
(respectively y-) marginal. For P ∈ P(X ) and a stochastic
matrix V : X → Y , P × V ∈ P(X × Y) denotes the joint
distribution P (x)V (y|x) and P ◦ V ∈ P(Y) denotes the y-
marginal of the joint distribution P × V , that is (P ◦ V)(y) =
(P × V)Y (y) =
∑
x P (x)V (y|x).
We denote the type of a sequence xn ∈ Xn by Qˆxn ∈
P(X ). A distribution P ∈ P(X ) is an n-type if ∀x ∈
X : nP (x) ∈ Z. We denote the set of n-types on X as
Pn(X ) ( P(X ) and use the fact that |Pn(X )| ≤ (n + 1)|X |
[22, Lemma 2.2] repeatedly. If P ∈ Pn(X ), we denote the set
of all sequences of type P as T nP ⊂ Xn.
For a distribution P ∈ P(X ), supp(P ) , {x ∈ X : P (x) >
0}. If P,Q ∈ P(X ) are a pair of distributions we say P is
absolutely continuous with respect to Q, and denote this by
P ≪ Q, if supp(P ) ⊆ supp(Q).
The ℓ1 distance and divergence between two distributions
P,Q ∈ P(X ) are, respectively, defined as
|P −Q| ,
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| (3)
and
D(P‖Q) ,
∑
x∈X
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
(4)
(here and in the sequel the bases of log and exp are arbitrary
but the same). For two stochastic matrices V : X → Y and
W : X → Y , and P ∈ P(X ), the conditional divergence is
defined as
D(V ‖W |P ) ,
∑
x∈X
P (x)
∑
y∈Y
V (y|x) log
V (y|x)
W (y|x)
(5)
= D(P × V ‖P ×W ). (6)
1Let θ be a parameter that f and g depend on. If fθ(n) ≤˙ gθ(n) then,
∀θ, lim supn→∞
1
n
log
(
fθ(n)
gθ(n)
)
≤ 0 but the reverse is not true. In fact
fθ(n) ≤˙ gθ(n) is equivalent to lim supn→∞ supθ 1n log
(
fθ(n)
gθ(n)
)
≤ 0
which is a stronger statement than the former.
For P ∈ P(X ),
H(P ) , −
∑
x∈X
P (x) logP (x). (7)
For Q ∈ P(X ×Y), I(Q) , D(Q‖QX ×QY ). If P ∈ P(X )
and V : X → Y is a stochastic matrix, I(P, V ) , I(P × V )
denotes the mutual information developed across the channel
V with input distribution P .
III. SECRECY VIA CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY
As we mentioned earlier, channel resolvability is a con-
venient and powerful tool for the analysis of secrecy [4],
[5]. The concept of resolvability dates back to Wyner [23],
where he observed that, given a stationary memoryless channel
W : X → Z and an input distribution PX that induces the
distribution PZ = PX ◦ W at its output, it is possible to
well-approximate the product distribution PnZ at the output
of Wn (the product channel corresponding to n independent
uses of W ) by transmitting a uniformly chosen codeword
from a code of rate R > I(X ;Z). Indeed, if the code
is sampled from the i.i.d. random coding ensemble, with
very high probability the normalized divergence between the
channel output distribution and PnZ can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing n sufficiently large. Han and Verdu´ [24]
and Hayashi [7] developed this theory further by replacing
the measure of approximation by normalized ℓ1 distance and
unnormalized divergence, respectively, and showed first, that
the same limits on the code size hold in these cases and,
second, that the distance between the output distribution and
the target distribution PnZ vanishes exponentially fast as the
block-length increases (similar results are derived in [11],
[14], [25] as well). In particular, in [7], [10], [11], [15], the
exponential decay of the informational divergence is leveraged
to establish an exponentially decaying upper bound on the
information leaked to the eavesdropper in wiretap channel’s
model.
We can extend the notion of resolvability and ask for
the approximation of arbitrary target distributions. Given a
code Cn = {xn1 , . . . , xnM} (of block-length n and size M )
and the channel W : X → Z , denote by PCn the output
distribution of Wn when a uniformly chosen codeword from
Cn is transmitted, that is,
PCn(z
n) ,
1
M
M∑
i=1
Wn(zn|xni ). (8)
Definition 2. Given a stationary memoryless channel
W : X → Z , a rate R, and a sequence of target distributions
Φ = {Φn ∈ P(Zn)}n∈N, a number EΦ(W,R) is an achiev-
able resolvability exponent over the channel W , at rate R, with
respect to Φ if there exists a sequence {Cn}n∈N of codes (Cn
of block-length n), such that lim supn→∞ 1n log |Cn| ≤ R and
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logD(PCn‖Φn) ≥ E
Φ(W,R). (9)
Definition 3. The supremum of all achievable resolvability
exponents over W : X → Z , at rate R, with respect to
Φ = {Φn ∈ P(Zn)}n∈N is the resolvability exponent of the
channel W : X → Z at rate R with respect to Φ.
4Computing “the” resolvability exponent is a difficult task as
it necessitates a search over all possible sequences of codes to
find the best resolvability code. The usual way to circumvent
such a difficulty is to use the probabilistic method and analyze
the achievable exponents for an ensemble of random codes.
Definition 4. Given Π = {PXn ∈ P(Xn)}n∈N, a sequence of
probability distributions on Xn, an ensemble of random codes
of rate (at most) R is a sequence of random codes Cn of block-
length n and size M = ⌊exp(nR)⌋ obtained by sampling the
codewords independently from the distribution PXn . In other
words,
Pr
{
Cn = {x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
M}
}
=
M∏
i=1
PXn(x
n
i ). (10)
Definition 5. Given Π = {PXn ∈ P(Xn)}n∈N, a stationary
memoryless channel W : X → Z , and a rate R, a number
Es(Π,W,R) is an achievable resolvability exponent for the
ensemble of random codes of rate (at most) R defined by Π,
over the channel W , if
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] ≥ Es(Π,W,R), (11)
where Cn is a random code of size M = ⌊exp(nR)⌋ dis-
tributed according to (10) and the sequence of target distribu-
tions {P¯Zn ∈ P(Zn)}n∈N is defined as
P¯Zn(z
n) , (PXn ◦W
n)(zn) =
∑
xn∈Xn
PXn(x
n)Wn(zn|xn).
(12)
Remark. In the passage to the probabilistic method, we re-
stricted the sequence of target measures to those induced by
the code sampling distribution PXn at the output of the n-fold
use of W , (12). Indeed, it is easy to verify that when Cn is a
random code whose codewords are drawn independently from
PXn , for any distribution Φn ∈ P(Zn),
E[D(PCn‖Φn)] = E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] +D(P¯Zn‖Φn). (13)
Therefore, to show the existence of good resolvability codes
for approximating a sequence of target distributions {Φn ∈
P(Zn)}n∈N via random coding arguments, we can exclusively
consider the ensembles of random codes whose sampling
distribution PXn induces Φn at the output of Wn—any
other ensemble is suboptimal due to the residual divergence
D(P¯Zn‖Φn).
Definition 6. The exact resolvability exponent of the ensemble
of random codes of rate (at most) R defined via the sequence
of distributions Π = {PXn ∈ P(Xn)}n∈N, over the channel
W : X → Z , is defined as
Es(Π,W,R) , lim
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] (14)
(where P¯Zn , PXn ◦Wn) provided that the limit exists.
For the sake of completeness, let us also formally define
the error exponent for an ensemble of random codes.
Definition 7. Given Π = {PXn ∈ P(Xn)}n∈N, a stationary
memoryless channel W : X → Y , and a rate R, a number
Er(Π,W,R) is called an achievable error exponent of the
ensemble Π at rate R on channel W , if
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S}] ≥ Er(Π,W,R) (15)
when Cn, a random code of size M = ⌈exp(nR)⌉ is used to
communicate a uniformly chosen message S ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
via n independent uses of W , yn is the output sequence of
Wn, and sˆML(yn) is the ML estimation of S given yn.
Remark. For the ensembles of interest in this paper, i.e., the
ensembles of i.i.d. and constant-composition random codes
the exact error exponents are well-known [22], [26], [27].
(The exactness of the random exponent of [22, Theorem 10.2]
follows from exponential tightness of the truncated union
bound [28, Appendix A].)
Definition 8. Given a sequence distributions Π = {PXn ∈
P(Xn)}n∈N, and a pair of secret message and random binning
rates (Rs, R) a random wiretap channel code is obtained by
partitioning a random code of size ⌈exp[n(Rs + R)]⌉ in the
ensemble of random codes defined via Π into Ms
.
= exp(nRs)
sub-codes (or bins) of size ⌊exp(nR)⌋, denoted as Csn, s ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,Ms}, each associated to a message. To communicate
the message s, the encoder transmits a codeword from the sub-
code Csn uniformly at random (thus it requires an entropy rate
of R).
Theorem 1. Let WM : X → Y and WE : X → Z be the pair
of legitimate receiver’s and wiretapper’s stationary memory-
less channels respectively (see Figure 1). Fix a sequence of
codeword sampling distributions Π = {PXn ∈ P(Xn)}n∈N.
Let Er(Π,WM, R) be an achievable error exponent for the
ensemble Π over the channel WM at rate R (see Definition 7)
and Es(Π,WE, R) be the exact resolvability exponent of the
ensemble Π over the channel WE at rate R (see Definition 6).
Then for any rate pair (Rs, R) such that Es(Π,WE, R+Rs) >
Es(Π,WE, R), using the ensemble of random wiretap channel
codes constructed as in Definition 8, when the secret message
S is uniformly distributed,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S}] ≥ Er(Π,WM, R+Rs)
(16)
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[I(S;Zn)] = Es(Π,WE, R),
(17)
where sˆML(yn) is the ML estimation of the sent message given
yn, the output of legitimate receiver’s channel. In other words,
Es (evaluated at the random binning rate R) is also the exact
secrecy exponent for the ensemble Π.
Proof: That Er(Π,WM, R + Rs) is an achievable error
exponent for the legitimate receiver is obvious: probability of
misdecoding the message S is upper-bounded by probability
of incorrect decoding of the sent codeword. We shall, hence,
only prove (17).
Since, to communicate a particular message s ∈ Sn, the
encoder transmits a codeword from the code Csn associated
to the message s, conditioned on S = s the output of WnE
has distribution PCsn and, since S is uniformly distributed,
5the unconditional output distribution of WnE will be PCn (cf.
(8)). Therefore, the identity I(A;B) = D(PB|A‖QB|PA) −
D(PB‖QB) (for (A,B) ∼ PAB and any arbitrary distribution
QB) yields:
E[I(S;Zn)] = E[D(PCSn ‖P¯Zn |PS)]−E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]. (18)
Using the linearity of expectation and the fact that the sub-
codes Csn are identically distributed we get:
E[D(PCSn ‖P¯Zn |PS)] =
Ms∑
s=1
PS(s)E[D(PCsn‖P¯Zn)]
= E[D(PC1n‖P¯Zn)]. (19)
Thus, by (14), we have
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[D(PCsn‖P¯Zn |PS)] = Es(Π,WE, R), (20)
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
logE[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] = Es(Π,WE, R+Rs)
> Es(Π,WE, R). (21)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that
Es(Π,WE, R+Rs) > Es(Π,WE, R). Using (20) and (21) in
(18) concludes the proof.
Remark 1. That (a lower bound to) the resolvability exponent,
lower-bounds the secrecy exponent is already used in [7], [10],
[11]. Theorem 1 complements this result by showing that the
exact resolvability exponent equals the exact secrecy exponent.
Remark 2. To show the achievability of Er in the proof
of Theorem 1, we used a decoder that estimates the sent
codeword and then decides to which sub-code it belongs.
In [29] it has been shown that, when the code sampling
distribution PXn depends on xn only through its type, the
error exponent of this decoder is the same as that of the optimal
decoder (that computes the likelihood score for each message
s by summing up the likelihoods of all codewords in Csn and
then decides on the most likely message) for an average code
in the ensemble.
Remark 3. Equations (16) and (17) suggest a trade-off in
code design in terms of the choice of input distributions,
Π = {PXn ∈ P(X
n)}n∈N. The sequence of input distribu-
tions Π that maximizes Es may not coincide with the one that
maximizes Er.
Theorem 1 reduces the problem of computing the exact
secrecy exponent of the ensemble to that of computing the
exact resolvability exponent of the ensemble which is easier
as the former involves the divergence between two random dis-
tributions PCsn and PCn while the latter depends only on PCsn .
The assumption on uniform prior of secret messages is crucial
to establish such a result.2 However, in a practical system,
the user chooses the distribution of the secret messages and
it is desirable to have a worst-case guarantee of performance.
Therefore, before continuing with the main results of the paper,
it is worth mentioning the following result (which is proved
in Appendix A).
2Without such an assumption I(S;Zn) = 0, namely, the secrecy exponent
is infinity if PS is positive only for a single secret message.
Theorem 2. Let WM : X → Y and WE : X → Z be the pair
of legitimate receiver’s and wiretapper’s stationary memory-
less channels respectively (see Figure 1) and Π = {PXn ∈
P(Xn)}n∈N be a sequence of code sampling distributions. If
Er(Π,WM, R) is an achievable error exponent for the ensem-
ble Π over the channel WM at rate R that is continuous in
R and Es(Π,WE, R) is an achievable resolvability exponent
of the ensemble Π over the channel WE, then there exists
a sequence of wiretap channel codes of secret message Rs
and random binning rate R in the ensemble (indexed by their
block-length n) using which,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S} ≥ Er(Π,WM, R+Rs),
(22)
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log I(S;Zn) ≥ Es(Π,WE, R) (23)
for any distribution of the secret message PS .
IV. EXACT RESOLVABILITY EXPONENTS
In light of Theorem 1, we shall focus on deriving the exact
resolvability exponents for the ensembles of i.i.d. and constant-
composition random codes. Accordingly, Cn will denote the
random resolvability code in this section and not the entire
wiretap channel code.
A. Main Result
Theorem 3. Let Cn be a random code of block-length n and
rate R constructed by sampling M = ⌊exp(nR)⌋ codewords
independently from the distribution PXn ∈ P(Xn) (see (10)).
Let W : X → Z be a discrete memoryless channel and PCn
be the (random) output distribution of Wn when a uniformly
chosen codeword from Cn is transmitted via n independent
uses of W (see (8)). Then,
(i) if PXn = PnX for some PX ∈ P(X ),
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
.
=
{
exp
(
−nEi.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R)
)
if I(PX ,W ) > 0,
0 if I(PX ,W ) = 0,
(24)
where
Ei.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R) = min
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
{
D(Q‖PX ×W )
+ [R− f(Q‖PX ×W )]
+
}
,
(25a)
with
f(Q‖Q′) ,
∑
(x,z)∈X×Z
Q(x, z) log
Q′(x, z)
Q′X(x)Q
′
Z(z)
,
(25b)
for any two distributions Q,Q′ ∈ P(X × Z);
6(ii) if PXn(xn) = 1
{
xn ∈ T nPn
}
/
∣∣T nPn ∣∣ for some sequence
of n-types {Pn ∈ Pn(X )}n∈N that converge to PX ∈
P(X ), i.e., limn→∞ |Pn − PX | = 0,
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
.
=
{
exp
(
−nEc.c.s,n (Pn,W,R)
)
if I(PX ,W ) > 0,
0 if I(PX ,W ) = 0,
(26)
where
Ec.c.s,n (Pn,W,R) = min
V : X→Z:
Pn×V ∈Pn(X×Z)
{
D(V ‖W |Pn)
+ [R− gn(V ‖W |Pn)]
+
}
, (27a)
with
gn(V ‖W |P ) , ω(V ‖W |P ) +H(P ◦ V )
+ min
V ′ : X→Z:
P×V ′∈Pn(X×Z),
P◦V ′=P◦V
D(V ′‖W |P ),
(27b)
and
ω(V ‖W |P ) ,
∑
(x,z)∈X×Z
P (x)V (z|x) logW (z|x),
(27c)
for any distribution P ∈ P(X ) and pair of stochastic
matrices V : X → Z and W : X → Z .
Recall that in the above P¯Zn = PXn ◦Wn (see (12)).
Theorem 3 gives exponentially tight bounds on the expected
divergence between the output distribution of Wn, when
its input is a uniformly chosen codeword from a randomly
chosen code and the distribution induced by the code sampling
distribution at any finite (but possibly large) block-length
n. As a consequence, the exact exponential decay rate of
the aforementioned divergence, namely the exact resolvability
exponent for the ensembles of interest, is the limit of the
exponents of (24) and (26) as n goes to infinity. The exact
resolvability exponents have the same forms as (25) and (27)
except that the search space of the minimizations will change
from the grid of empirical distributions to the set of all
distributions.
Theorem 4.
(i) For the sequence of i.i.d. random codes of rate R, i.e.,
those defined via the sequence of sampling distributions
{PXn = PnX}n∈N for some PX ∈ P(X ),
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
log(E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)])
=
{
Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R) if I(PX ,W ) > 0,
+∞ if I(PX ,W ) = 0,
(28)
where
Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R) = min
Q∈P(X×Z)
{
D(Q‖PX ×W )
+ [R − f(Q‖PX ×W )]
+
}
,
(29)
and f is defined in (25b).
(ii) For the sequence of constant-composition random codes
of rate R, i.e., those defined via the sequence of sampling
distributions
{
PXn = 1
{
xn ∈ T nPn
}
/
∣∣T nPn ∣∣}n∈N for
some sequence of n-types {Pn ∈ Pn(X )}n∈N that
converge to PX , namely, limn→∞ |Pn − PX | = 0,
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
log(E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)])
=
{
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) if I(PX ,W ) > 0,
+∞ if I(PX ,W ) = 0,
(30)
where
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) = min
V :X→Z
{
D(V ‖W |PX)
+ [R− g(V ‖W |PX)]
+
}
, (31a)
with
g(V ‖W |P ) , ω(V ‖W |P ) +H(P ◦ V )
+ min
V ′:X→Z
P◦V ′=P◦V
D(V ‖W |P ), (31b)
for any distribution P ∈ P(X ) and pair of stochastic
matrices V : X → Z and W : X → Z (and ω defined
as in (27c)).
Both exponents Ei.i.d.s and Ec.c.s are positive and strictly
increasing in R for R > I(PX ,W ). Moreover, the value of
Ei.i.d.s can be computed through
Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R) = max
0≤λ≤1
{λR− F0(PX ,W, λ)} (32a)
with
F0(PX ,W, λ)
, log
∑
(x,z)∈X×Z
PX(x)W (z|x)
1+λ(PX ◦W)(z)
−λ.
(32b)
Theorem 4 is proved in Appendix B.
Corollary 5. The exponents Ei.i.d.s (PX ,WE, R) and
Ec.c.s (PX ,WE, R) of (29) and (31) are the exact secrecy
exponents for the ensembles of random wiretap channel
codes of rate pair (R,Rs) constructed from the ensembles of
random i.i.d. and constant-composition codes, respectively,
provided that Rs > 0 and R > I(PX ,WE).
B. Comparison of Exponents
Corollary 5 states that the exponent Ei.i.d.s , which was
already derived in [8], [10], [11] is, indeed, the exact secrecy
exponent for the ensemble of i.i.d. random codes. (The ex-
ponent is expressed in the form of (32) in [8], [10], [11].) In
contrast, it can be shown that Ec.c.s , the exact secrecy exponent
for the ensemble of constant-composition random codes, is
larger than the previously-derived lower bound in [13]:
Es(PX ,WE, R) = max
0≤λ≤1
{λR− E0(PX ,WE, λ)}, (33a)
7with
E0(PX ,W, λ)
, log
∑
z∈Z
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)W (z|x)
1
1−λ
)1−λ
. (33b)
(Note that the function E0 in (33b) is essentially Gallager’s
E0 [26] up to a minus sign.) For every discrete memoryless
stationary channel W : X → Z ,
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) ≥ Es(PX ,W,R). (34)
This follows from the fact that g(V ‖W |P ) ≤ I(P, V ) using
similar steps as in [22, Problem 10.24] to derive Gallager-style
expressions of error exponents (see Appendix C for a complete
proof).
As for comparing the secrecy exponents Ei.i.d.s and Ec.c.s ,
numerical examples show that in general, there is no ordering
between them. In particular, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, for
the binary symmetric channel and the binary erasure channel,
the ensemble of constant-composition random codes leads to
a larger exponent than the ensemble of i.i.d. random codes.
The two exponents are equal when the input distribution is
uniform. On the other side, in Figures 4 and 5, we see
that for asymmetric channels (the Z-channel and the binary
asymmetric channel) the ensemble of constant-composition
random codes results in a smaller secrecy exponent compared
to the ensemble of i.i.d. random codes. The reader may find
details on how the exponents are computed in Appendix D.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this section, we fix PX and set PXZ(x, z) =
PX(x)W (z|x). Moreover, we assume, without essential loss
of generality, that (i) supp(PX) = X (and for the constant-
composition codes, ∀n, supp(Pn) = X ), and (ii) for every
z ∈ Z , there exists at least one x ∈ X such that W (z|x) > 0.
Recall that the setting we are considering is as follows:
A random code Cn = {Xn1 , . . . , XnM} of block-length n
and size M = ⌊exp(nR)⌋ is constructed by sampling each
codeword independently from distribution PXn . A uniformly
chosen codeword from this code is transmitted through the
product channel Wn and the (random) distribution of its output
sequence is as in (8).
Trivial Case (zero-capacity channel): If PX is such that
I(X ;Z) = 0, then ∀x ∈ X and ∀z ∈ Z , W (z|x) = PZ(z).
This implies that for any code Cn, PCn = PnZ . Moreover,
P¯Zn = PXn ◦Wn = PnZ as well, thus, D(PCn‖P¯Zn) = 0
(with probability 1 for a random code) which, in turn, implies
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] = 0.
Now, we begin the non-trivial part of the proof, namely
when the channel output sequence Zn is correlated with its
input. For any fixed zn ∈ Zn, PCn(zn) is an average of M
i.i.d. random variables Wn(zn|Xni ), i = 1, . . . ,M and, hence,
is naturally expected to concentrate around its mean, which is
exactly P¯Zn(zn). However, since the distribution of each of
summands in (8) depends on n, a plain application of law of
large numbers is not possible in this setting. Let
L(zn) ,
{
PCn (z
n)
P¯Zn (zn)
if P¯Zn(zn) > 0,
1 otherwise,
(35)
denote the (random) likelihood ratio of each sequence zn ∈
Zn. By construction,
E[L(zn)] = 1, ∀zn ∈ Zn. (36)
Moreover, it follows that PCn ≪ P¯Zn with probability 1 (see
Lemma 6). Thus, the linearity of expectation yields
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] = E
[ ∑
zn∈Zn
PCn(z
n) log
(
PCn(z
n)
P¯Zn
)]
(37)
=
∑
zn∈Zn
E
[
PCn(z
n) log
(
PCn(z
n)
P¯Zn(zn)
)]
(38)
=
∑
zn∈Zn
P¯Zn(z
n)E[L(zn) logL(zn)] (39)
To prove Theorem 3 we derive exponentially tight bounds
on the value of E[L(zn) logL(zn)] (for each individual zn ∈
Zn) and eventually combine those bounds in (39) to derive
the exponents of Theorem 3.
A. Preliminaries
Lemma 6. Let P¯Zn be as defined in (12). Then:
(i) PCn ≪ P¯Zn with probability 1.
(ii) For any codeword sampling distribution PXn ∈ P(Xn)
that depends on xn only through its type, P¯Zn(zn) will
depend on zn only through its type.
(iii) For both choices of PXn in Theorem 3, ∀zn ∈
supp(P¯Zn), P¯Zn(z
n) > (1/α)n where
α ,


1
PminWmin
if PXn = PnX ,
|X |
Wmin
if PXn = 1
{
xn∈T nPn
}∣∣T n
Pn
∣∣ , (40)
with Pmin , minx∈X PX(x) and Wmin ,
min(x,z)∈X×Z : W (z|x)>0W (z|x).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark. For the i.i.d. random coding ensemble, i.e., when
PXn = P
n
X , the reference measure P¯Zn equals the product
measure PnZ and, hence, supp(P¯Zn) = Zn (since we assumed
supp(PX) = X and for every z ∈ Z there exists at least one
x ∈ X such that W (z|x) > 0). In contrast, when PXn is
the uniform distribution over the type-class T nPn (i.e., for the
constant-composition random coding ensemble) the support
of P¯Zn need not necessarily be Zn. For instance, consider
a binary erasure channel and Pn being uniform distribution
on {0, 1} (for even n). Then P¯Zn puts no mass on the all-
zero output sequence, and by symmetry, neither on the all-one
sequence.
Lemma 7. Let A be an arbitrary non-negative random vari-
able. Then, for any θ > 0,
c(θ)
[var(A)
E[A]
− τθ(A)
]
≤ E
[
A ln
( A
E[A]
)]
≤
var(A)
E[A]
(41)
where
τθ(A) , E[A]
[
θ2 Pr{A > (θ + 1)E[A]}
+ 2
∫ +∞
θ
vPr{A > (v + 1)E[A]}dv
]
, (42)
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and
c(θ) ,
(1 + θ) ln(1 + θ)− θ
θ2
. (43)
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remark. It follows from Jensen’s inequality that
E[A ln(A/E[A])]) ≥ 0. Lemma 7 improves this lower
bound for random variables with sufficiently small tails.
Unfortunately,L(zn) has heavy tails and a direct application
of Lemma 7 to L(zn) will not result in exponentially tight
bounds on E
[
L(zn) logL(zn)
]
. However, it turns out that
L(zn) can be split into light- and heavy-tail components. As
we shall see shortly, the heavy-tail component contributes to
E
[
L(zn) logL(zn)
]
only via its mean and Lemma 7 can be
applied to the light-tail component to obtain exponentially
tight bounds on E
[
L(zn) logL(zn)
]
.
Since P¯Zn(zn) depends on zn only through its type, we can
use type enumeration method [29], [30] and write
L(zn) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Wn(zn|Xni )
P¯Zn(zn)
(44)
=
1
M
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
NQ(z
n)ℓ(Q) (45)
where
ℓ(Q) ,
Wn(z˜n|x˜n)
P¯Zn(z˜n)
for some (x˜n, z˜n) ∈ T nQ , (46)
and
NQ(z
n) ,
∣∣{xn ∈ Cn : (xn, zn) ∈ T nQ}∣∣ (47)
is the number of codewords in Cn that have joint type Q with
zn. Therefore, {NQ(zn) : Q ∈ Pn(X × Z)} is a multinomial
collection with cluster size M and success probabilities
pQ(z
n) =
|T nQ |
|T nQZ ||T
n
QX
|
PXn(T
n
QX )1{QZ = Qˆzn} (48)
(where Qˆzn denotes the type of zn) for any code sampling
distribution PXn(xn) that depends on xn through its type,
including our cases of interest. (The above equality is proved
in Appendix G.)
Partition Pn(X × Z) = Q′n ∪ Q′′n as
Q′n , {Q ∈ Pn(X × Z) : ℓ(Q) ≤ e
2M}, (49)
Q′′n , {Q ∈ Pn(X × Z) : ℓ(Q) > e
2M}, (50)
and, accordingly, split L(zn) = L1(zn) + L2(zn) as
L1(z
n) ,
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
NQ(z
n)ℓ(Q), (51)
L2(z
n) ,
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′′n
NQ(z
n)ℓ(Q). (52)
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Indeed, L1 turns out to be the light-tail component of L and
L2 its heavy-tail part. Let also,
ν(zn) , var
(
L1(z
n)
)
+
1
M
E[L1(z
n)]2, and (53)
µ(zn) , E[L2(z
n)]. (54)
Using elementary properties of multinomial distribution it can
be verified that
ν(zn) =
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2pQ(z
n) (55a)
µ(zn) =
∑
Q∈Q′′n
ℓ(Q)pQ(z
n) (55b)
(A proof of the above is given in Appendix H for com-
pleteness.) In the following two subsections we prove that
∀zn ∈ supp(P¯Zn),
E
[
L(zn) lnL(zn)
]
+
1
M
.
= ν(zn) + µ(zn). (56)
Since zn is fixed in both sides of (56) we drop it in subsec-
tions V-B and V-C to avoid cumbersome notation.
B. Achievability
For non-negative l1 and l2, and l = l1 + l2,
l ln(l) = l1 ln(l) + l2 ln(l) (57)
= l1 ln(l1) + l1 ln(1 + l2/l1) + l2 ln(l) (58)
≤ l1 ln(l1) + l2(1 + ln(l)) (59)
(since ln(1 + l2/l1) ≤ l2/l1), thus,
E[L lnL] ≤ E[L1 lnL1] + E[L2(1 + lnL)] (60)
(∗)
≤ E[L1 lnL1] + (1 + n lnα)E[L2] (61)
where (∗) follows from (iii) in Lemma 6 (as L = L(zn) ≤
1/P¯Zn(z
n)). The upper bound of (41) implies
E[L1 lnL1] ≤ E[L1] ln
(
E[L1]
)
+
var(L1)
E[L1]
(∗)
≤
var(L1)
E[L1]
(62)
where (∗) follows since E[L1] ≤ E[L] = 1. Moreover, using
(53) and the fact that E[L1] + E[L2] = 1 we have
var(L1)
E[L1]
=
ν
E[L1]
−
E[L1]
M
(63)
= ν
(
1 +
E[L2]
E[L1]
)
−
1− E[L2]
M
(64)
= ν + E[L2]
( ν
E[L1]
+
1
M
)
−
1
M
. (65)
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Since ℓ(Q) ≤Me2 for Q ∈ Q′n, using (55a) we have
ν ≤
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
e2M · ℓ(Q)pQ = e
2 E[L1]. (66)
Using the above in (65) and replacing E[L2] = µ, we get
var(L1)
E[L1]
+
1
M
≤ ν+E[L2]
(
e2+
1
M
)
≤ ν+(1+e2)µ, (67)
(since M ≥ 1). Finally, using (67) in (62) yields,
E[L1 lnL1] +
1
M
≤˙ ν + µ. (68)
Using (68) in (61) (and noting that α ≥ 1 only depends on
|X |, PX , and W ) we conclude that
E[L lnL] +
1
M
≤˙ ν + µ. (69)
C. Ensemble Converse
The choice of Q′′n implies
Pr
{
L2 ∈ (0, e
2)
}
= 0. (70)
This holds since either ∀Q ∈ Q′′n : NQ = 0 which implies
L2 = 0 or ∃Q0 ∈ Q′′n such that NQ0 ≥ 1, in which case,
L2 ≥
1
M
ℓ(Q0)NQ0 ≥
1
M
ℓ(Q0) ≥ e
2, (71)
(because ∀Q ∈ Q′′n, ℓ(Q) > e2M ). Consequently,
E[L2 lnL2] =
∑
l≥e2
l ln(l) Pr{L2 = l} (72)
≥ ln(e2)
∑
l≥e2
lPr{L2 = l} = 2E[L2]. (73)
For positive l1 and l2, and l = l1 + l2 ≥ max{l1, l2},
l ln(l) = l1 ln(l) + l2 ln(l) (74)
≥ l1 ln(l1) + l2 ln(l2). (75)
Therefore,
E[L lnL] ≥ E[L1 lnL1] + E[L2 lnL2]. (76)
Using the lower bound of (41) (with τθ(L1) and c(θ) defined
as in (42) and (43) respectively), ∀θ > 0:
E[L1 lnL1] ≥ E[L1] ln(E[L1]) + c(θ)
[var(L1)
E[L1]
− τθ(L1)
]
(77)
(a)
= (1 − E[L2]) ln(1− E[L2]) + c(θ)
[var(L1)
E[L1]
− τθ(L1)
]
(78)
(b)
≥ −E[L2] + c(θ)
[var(L1)
E[L1]
− τθ(L1)
]
. (79)
In the above (a) follows since E[L1] = 1−E[L2] and (b) since
(1 − ε) ln(1 − ε) ≥ −ε. Using (73) and (79) in (75) shows
that ∀θ > 0:
E[L lnL] ≥ c(θ)
[var(L1)
E[L1]
− τθ(L1)
]
+ E[L2]. (80)
Now we shall upper-bound τθ(L1). Starting by bounding
the tail of L1 we have
Pr{L1 ≥ (v + 1)E[L1]}
= Pr


∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)(NQ −MpQ) ≥Mv E[L1]

 (81)
≤ Pr


⋃
Q∈Q′n
{
ℓ(Q)(NQ −MpQ) ≥
MvE[L1]
|Q′n|
}

(82)
(a)
≤
∑
Q∈Q′n
Pr
{
ℓ(Q)(NQ −MpQ) ≥
MvE[L1]
|Q′n|
}
(83)
(b)
≤
∑
Q∈Q′n
E[ℓ(Q)4(NQ −MpQ)4]
(Mv E[L1]/|Q′n|)
4
(84)
=
|Q′n|
4
v4(E[L1])4
1
M4
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)4 E[(NQ −MpQ)
4], (85)
where (a) is the union bound and (b) follows by Markov
inequality. For N ∼ Binomial(M,p),
E[(N −Mp)4] = Mp(1− p)[1 + 3(M − 2)p(1− p)] (86)
≤ var(N) + 3 var(N)2. (87)
Continuing (85) we have
1
M4
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)4 E[(NQ −MpQ)
4]
≤
1
M4
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)4
(
var(NQ) + 3 var(NQ)
2
) (88)
(a)
≤˙
1
M2
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2 var(NQ) + 3
1
M4
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)4 var(NQ)
2
(89)
(b)
≤
1
M2
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2 var(NQ)
+ 3
[ 1
M2
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2 var(NQ)
]2
(90)
(c)
≤ ν + 3ν2
(d).
= ν, (91)
where (a) follows since ℓ(Q) ≤ e2M .= M for Q ∈ Q′n, (b)
since for positive summands, the sum of the squares is less
than the square of the sums, (c) since var(NQ) ≤MpQ, and
(d) since ν ≤ e2 E[L1] ≤ e2 (see (66)). Plugging (91) into
(85) we get
Pr{L1 ≥ (v + 1)E[L1]} ≤˙
|Q′n|
4ν
(E[L1])4
·
1
v4
. (92)
Using the above in (42) we get
τθ(L1) = E[L1]
[
θ2 Pr{L1 > (θ + 1)E[L1]}
+ 2
∫ +∞
θ
vPr{L1 > (v + 1)E[L1]}dv
]
(93)
≤˙ E[L1]
[θ2
θ4
+ 2
∫ +∞
θ
v
v4
dv
] |Q′n|4
E[L1]4
ν (94)
11
.
=
ν
E[L1]3
·
|Q′n|
4
θ2
. (95)
Since (95) implies τθ(L1) ≤ d(n)|Q′n|4ν/
(
θ2 E[L1]
3
)
for
some sub-exponentially increasing sequence d(n) (which only
depends on |X | and |Z|), taking
θn , 2
√
d(n)
|Q′n|
2
E[L1]
, (96)
we will have
τθn(L1) ≤
1
4
·
ν
E[L1]
. (97)
Using (53) and (97) in (80) we have
E[L(zn) lnL(zn)] ≥ c(θn)
[var(L1)
E[L1]
− τθn(L1)
]
+ E[L2]
(98)
≥ c(θn)
[ ν
E[L1]
−
1
M
E[L1]−
1
4
·
ν
E[L1]
]
+ E[L2] (99)
(∗)
≥ c(θn)
[3
4
·
ν
E[L1]
−
1
M
]
+ E[L2] (100)
(where (∗) follows because E[L1] ≤ 1). Since for θ > 0,
c(θ) ≤ c(0) = 12 < 1, we can further lower-bound (100) as
E[L lnL] ≥
3
4
c(θn)
ν
E[L1]
+ E[L2]−
1
M
(101)
Moreover,
c(θn) =
1
θn
·
(1 + θn) ln(1 + θn)− θn
θn
(102)
(a)
≥
1
θn
·
(1 + E[L1]θn) ln(1 + E[L1]θn)− E[L1]θn
E[L1]θn
(103)
= E[L1]
(1 + E[L1]θn) ln(1 + E[L1]θn)− E[L1]θn
(E[L1]θn)2
(104)
(b)
≥˙ E[L1], (105)
where (a) follows since (1+θ) ln(1+θ)−θθ is increasing in θ and
E[L1] ≤ 1, and (b) since (1+θ) ln(1+θ)−θθ2 is decreasing in θ (see
Lemma 10 in Appendix F) and E[L1]θn = 2
√
d(n)|Q′n|
2 ≤
2
√
d(n)(n + 1)2|X ||Z|. Using this lower bound in (101) we
get
E[L lnL] +
1
M
≥˙ ν + µ (106)
D. Derivation of Exponents for Each Ensemble
Equations (69) and (106) prove (56). Plugging in the values
of ν(zn) and µ(zn) from (55a) and (55b) and continuing (56),
we get
E
[
L(zn) lnL(zn)
]
+
1
M
.
= ν(zn) + µ(zn) (107)
=
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
ℓ(Q)pQ(z
n)κ
(
ℓ(Q)/M
) (108)
where
κ(λ) =
{
1 λ > e2,
λ λ ≤ e2.
(109)
It is easy to check that
min{1, λ} ≤ κ(λ) ≤ e2min{1, λ} (110)
Therefore, (108) can be simplified as
E
[
L(zn) lnL(zn)
]
+
1
M
.
=
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
ℓ(Q)pQ(z
n)min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (111)
Using the above in (39) we get
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] +
log(e)
M
.
=
∑
zn∈Zn
P¯Zn(z
n)
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
ℓ(Q)pQ(z
n)min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
(112)
=
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
ℓ(Q)min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
} ∑
zn∈Zn
pQ(z
n)P¯Zn(z
n).
(113)
Plugging in the value of pQ(zn) from (48) we get∑
zn∈Zn
pQ(z
n)P¯Zn(z
n) =
|T nQ |
|T nQX ||T
n
QZ
|
PXn
(
T nQX
)
P¯Zn
(
T nQZ
)
.
(114)
Moreover, defining
ω(Q) =
∑
x,z
Q(x, z) logW (z|x), (115)
and recalling that P¯Zn depends on zn only through its type,
we deduce that
ℓ(Q) =
exp
(
nω(Q)
)
P¯Zn
(
T nQZ
)
/|T nQZ |
(116)
Combining (114) and (116) yields
ℓ(Q)
∑
zn
pQ(z
n)P¯Zn(z
n) = exp
{
nω(Q)
}
|T nQ |
PXn
(
T nQX
)∣∣T nQX ∣∣
(117)
.
= exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
PXn
(
T nQX
)
, (118)
where the last equality follows since |T nQ |
.
= exp{nH(Q)}
(respectively, |T nQX |
.
= exp{nH(QX)}). Thus, we have
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] +
log(e)
M
.
=
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (119)
Observe that since
ℓ(PXZ) ≥ exp{nω(PXZ)}
∣∣T nPZ ∣∣ ≥˙ exp{nI(X ;Z)}, (120)
taking Q = PXZ shows that the right-hand-side of (119)
decays at most as fast as exp{−n[R − I(X ;Z)]+} which
is strictly slower than 1M = exp(−nR) since I(X ;Z) > 0.
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Consequently we can ignore the term log(e)M on the left-hand-
side of (119) and conclude that
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
.
=
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (121)
(The careful reader may argue that PXZ may not be an n-
type for all n and, hence, find our reasoning for the passage
from (119) to (121) inaccurate. While this concern is valid,
the claim is true regardless as we can always find a sequence
of n-types that converge to PXZ . We give a rigorous and more
detailed proof of (121) in Appendix I.)
1) Ensemble of i.i.d. random codes: When PXn = PnX ,
PXn(T
n
QX )
.
= exp{−nD(QX‖PX)} (122)
Moreover, P¯Zn(zn) = PnZ (zn) (where PZ = PX ◦W ). There-
fore, P¯Zn(zn) = exp{n
∑
z QZ(z) logPZ(z)} if zn ∈ T nQZ .
Therefore,
ℓ(Q) =
exp{nω(Q)}
PnZ (z
n)
= exp
{
n
∑
x,z
Q(x, z) log
W (z|x)
PZ(z)
}
= exp
{
nf(Q‖PXZ)
}
. (123)
where f is defined in (25b). As a consequence,
min{1, ℓ(Q)/M}
.
= exp
{
−n[R− f(Q‖PXZ)]
+
}
. (124)
Using (122) and (124) in (121) (together with the fact that
|Pn(X × Z)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Z|) conclude that
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
.
= exp
{
−n min
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
{
D(Q‖QX ×W )
+D(QX‖PX) + [R− f(Q‖PXZ)]
+
}}
. (125)
Simplifying the above exponent yields (25).
2) Ensemble of constant-composition random codes: When
the code sampling distribution, PXn , is the uniform dis-
tribution over the type-class T nPn , PXn
(
T nQX
)
= 0 unless
QX = Pn, i.e., Q = Pn × V for some V : X → Z such that
Pn×V ∈ Pn(X ×Z). (To keep the notation simple, we omit
this last condition from the following equations.) Therefore
(121) reduces to
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
.
=
∑
V : X→Z
exp
{
−nD(V ‖W |Pn)
}
×min{1, ℓ(Pn × V )/M}. (126)
It remains to evaluate
ℓ(Pn × V ) =
Wn(zn|xn)
P¯Zn(zn)
, (127)
for some xn ∈ T nPn and z
n ∈ T nV (x
n), where T nV (xn) is the
V -shell of xn. To this end, we note that
P¯Zn(z
n) =
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
W (zn|xn) (128)
=
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
W (zn|xn)
∑
V ′ : X→Z
1{zn ∈ T nV ′(x
n)}
(129)
=
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
∑
V ′ : X→Z
1{zn ∈ T nV ′(x
n)}W (zn|xn)
(130)
=
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
∑
V ′ : X→Z
1{zn ∈ T nV ′(x
n)}
× exp
[
−n(D(V ′‖W |Pn) +H(V
′|Pn))
] (131)
=
∑
V ′ : X→Z
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
1{zn ∈ T nV ′(x
n)}
× exp
[
−n(D(V ′‖W |Pn) +H(V
′|Pn))
]
. (132)
(Recall again that V ′ must also be such that Pn × V ′ is an
n-type but we omit this condition from the equations for the
sake of brevity.) As we have already shown in the proof of
(48) (cf. Appendix G),
1
|T nPn |
∑
xn∈T n
Pn
1{zn ∈ T nV ′(x
n)}
=
|T nPn×V ′ |
|T nPn ||T
n
Pn◦V ′
|
1{Pn ◦ V
′ = Qˆzn} (133)
.
= exp
[
n[H(V ′|Pn)−H(Pn ◦ V
′)]
]
1{Pn ◦ V
′ = Qˆzn}
(134)
(where Qˆzn is the type of zn). Using (134) in (132) and
recalling that zn has type Pn ◦ V we get
P¯Zn(z
n)
.
= exp
[
−n[H(Pn ◦ V )
+ min
V ′ : X→Z
Pn◦V=Pn◦V
D(V ′‖W |Pn)]
]
, (135)
which, in turn, shows
ℓ(Pn × V )
.
= exp
[
−ngn(V ‖W |Pn)
] (136)
with gn defined as in (27b). Therefore,
min{1, ℓ(Pn × V )/M}
.
= exp
[
−n[R− gn(V ‖W |Pn)]
+
]
.
(137)
Using (137) in (126) proves (27).
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We studied the exact exponential decay rate of the infor-
mation leaked to the eavesdropper in Wyner’s wiretap channel
setting when an average wiretap channel code in the ensem-
ble of i.i.d. or constant-composition random codes is used
for communication. Our analysis shows that the previously-
derived lower bound on the secrecy exponent of i.i.d. random
codes in [8]–[11] is, indeed, tight. Moreover, our result for
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constant-composition random codes improves upon that of
[13] (see (34) and examples in Section IV-B).
A key step in our analysis (which is applicable to any
ensemble of random codes with independently sampled code-
words) is to observe the equivalence of secrecy and resolvabil-
ity exponents for the ensemble and, as a result, reducing the
problem to the analysis of the resolvability exponent. The latter
is easier as the informational divergence of interest (whose
exponential decay rate is being assessed) involves a single
random distribution (the output distribution) while the former
involves two (the conditional and unconditional output distri-
butions). We should emphasize that establishing secrecy via
channel resolvability is a standard technique which was used
in [5], [7], [10], [11], [15] (also, in combination with privacy
amplification in [8], [13]) whose advantages are discussed in
[4]. Our result (Theorem 1) highlights the usefulness of this
tool by showing that the resolvability exponent is not only
a lower bound to the secrecy exponent but also equals the
secrecy exponent.
Thanks to such a reduction, we extended the method of [11]
to derive the exact resolvability exponent of random codes.
It is noteworthy that, as it was already envisioned in [11],
the method presented there was conveniently applicable to the
ensemble of constant-composition random codes (as well as
the ensemble of i.i.d. random codes already studied in [11]).
It is remarkable that, unlike the channel coding problem
for which constant-composition random codes turn out to
be never worse than i.i.d. random codes in terms of the
exponent [22], for the secrecy problem we have examples (see
Figures 4 and 5) where i.i.d. random codes perform better
than constant-composition codes. The examples presented in
Section IV-B suggest that the superior ensemble (in terms of
the secrecy exponent) depends on the channel WE alone (i.e.,
for a given channel, either of the ensembles yields a better
secrecy exponent for all input distributions). A subject for
future research would be to characterize the set of channels for
which the ensemble of i.i.d. random codes results in a better
secrecy exponent (and vice versa).
As shown in [2], for general pairs of channels (WM,WE),
the secrecy capacity is given by
max
PUX :
U−◦X−◦ (Y,Z)
{I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)}. (138)
The secrecy capacity equals
max
PX
{I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)} (139)
when ∀PX , I(X ;Y ) ≥ I(X ;Z). Accordingly, for the general
case and when the secrecy capacity is positive, one can
construct wiretap channel codes by prefixing the channel with
an auxiliary channel PX|U : U → X . Channel prefixing is also
proposed in [10] as a technique to treat the wiretap channels
with cost constraints. (The auxiliary channel PX|U will be cho-
sen such that its output sequence satisfies the cost constraints
for the physical channel.) It is obvious that our results (as well
as those of others cited) are immediately extensible to such
cases. More precisely, for a given auxiliary channel PX|U , the
exponents of (29) and (31), evaluated for the effective channel
PZ|U (z|u) =
∑
x PX|U (x|u)WE(z|x) (instead of WE) and
the input distribution PU are the ensemble-optimal secrecy
exponents of both random-coding ensembles. Observe that in
this setting PX|U (in addition to the random-binning rate R)
is also a design parameter which can be exploited to optimize
the secrecy exponent.3 Moreover, it should also be noted that
in the prefixed setting, in addition to the entropy rate of R bits
per channel use (for random binning), the encoder requires an
entropy rate of H(X |U) bits per channel use to simulate the
channel PX|U that has to be taken into account in comparison
of the secrecy exponents.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider the sequence of random wiretap channel codes
of secret message size 2Ms, Ms = exp(nRs) and random
binning rate R in the sense of Definition 8. Namely, those
obtained by partitioning a random code of size 2 exp[n(R +
Rs)] into 2Ms sub-codes of rate R. (Assume R and Rs are
chosen such exp[n(R+Rs)], exp(nRs) and exp(nR) are all
integers for notational brevity.) Let
P¯e,n , E[Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S}], (140)
D¯n , E[D(PCSn ‖P¯Zn |PS)]. (141)
when S is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , 2Ms} with Y n
and Zn being the output sequences of the legitimate receiver’s
and wiretapper’s channel respectively as in Figure 1, PCsn
being the distribution of wiretapper’s channel output sequence
when a uniformly chosen codeword from the sub-code Csn
is transmitted (see (8)) and P¯Zn the distribution induced by
codeword sampling distribution at the output of wiretapper’s
channel (see (12)). (The expectation is taken over the choice
of codebook Cn =
⋃2Ms
s=1 C
s
n) By the assumptions of Theorem
(in particular, the continuity of Er in rate) and the linearity of
expectation we have
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log(P¯e,n) ≥ Er(Π,WM, Rs +R), (142)
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log(D¯n) ≥ Es(Π,WE, R). (143)
Markov’s inequality implies that for each n, with probability
at least 23 over the choice of random codes
Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S} =
1
2Ms
2Ms∑
s=1
Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S|S = s} ≤ 3P¯e,n,
(144)
and, with probability at least 23
D(PCSn ‖P¯Zn |PS) =
1
2Ms
2Ms∑
s=1
D(PCsn‖P¯Zn) ≤ 3P¯e,n. (145)
Therefore, with probability at least 13 , the random code is cho-
sen such that both bounds of (144) and (145) simultaneously
hold. Let Csn, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2Ms} be the collection of sub-
codes that define any such good code. Since the summands in
3The authors thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to their
attention.
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the summation of (144) are all positive, there exists a subset
Sn,e ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2Ms} of cardinality |Sn,e| > 32Ms such that
∀s ∈ Sn,e,
Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S|S = s} ≤ 12P¯e,n. (146)
Similarly, since the summands in (145) are positive, there
exists a subset Sn,s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2Ms} of cardinality |Sn,s| >
3
2Ms such that ∀s ∈ Sn,s
D(PCs‖P¯Zn) ≤ 12D¯n. (147)
Pick any Sn ⊆ Sn,e ∩ Sn,s of cardinality |Sn| = Ms (this is
possible since |Sn,e ∩ Sn,s| ≥ Ms) and consider the wiretap
channel code that associates the sub-code Csn to each message
s ∈ Sn. This is a code of secret message rate Rs and, when it
is employed with any prior PS on secret messages, satisfies
Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S} ≤ 12P¯e,n, (148)
due to (146), and
I(S;Zn) ≤ D(PCsn‖P¯Zn |PS) ≤ 12D¯n, (149)
due to (147). Using this sequence of expurgated codes we will
have
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log Pr{sˆML(Y
n) 6= S} ≥ lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
P¯e,n
≥ Er(Π,WM, R+Rs) (150)
by combining (148) and (142), and
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log I(S;Zn) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
D¯n ≥ Es(Π,WE, R)
(151)
by combining (149) and (143), respectively.
Remark. The secrecy part of the proof hinges on finding
exp(nRs) “good” resolvability codes via expurgation: we first
generated twice as many resolvability codes as we needed
and then threw away the “bad” half. Very recently, in [31], it
was shown that the probability of choosing a bad resolvability
code, namely a code Cn (of block-length n) for which the
ℓ1 distance between the output distribution PCn (8) and the
reference measure P¯Zn is more than exp(−nγ) for some
exponent γ, is doubly exponentially small in n. This suggests
that even if we draw exp(nRs) codes in a single-shot from
the ensemble, with very high probability they are all good
resolvability codes. Nevertheless, we do not know if the results
of [31] hold for the exponents presented in this work. (Also
in this work we measure the approximation quality by KL
divergence as opposed to ℓ1 norm but, at least for the i.i.d.
random coding ensemble the KL divergence has the same
exponential decay rate as the ℓ1 distance [25, Equation (30)].)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The results when I(PX ,W ) = 0 are trivial. So we only
proceed with the proofs for the case I(PX ,W ) > 0.
A. Proof of (i)
Let PXZ = PX ×W for the sake of brevity. We need to
show that
lim
n→∞
Ei.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R) = E
i.i.d.
s (PX ,W,R). (152)
Recall that Ei.i.d.s,n and Ei.i.d.s are defined in (25) and (29)
respectively. Since Pn(X ×Z) ⊂ P(X ×Z) we trivially have
lim
n→∞
Ei.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R) ≥ E
i.i.d.
s (PX ,W,R) (153)
Let Q⋆ be the minimizing distribution in the right-hand-side
of (29). Since ⋃n∈N Pn(X ×Z) is dense in P(X ×Z), there
exists a sequence of n-types {Q⋆n ∈ Pn(X × Z)}n∈N such
that limn→∞ |Q⋆n −Q⋆| = 0. We, also have,
D(Q⋆n‖PXZ) + [R− f(Q
⋆
n‖PXZ)]
+ ≥ Ei.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R)
(154)
Moreover we note that Q⋆ ≪ PXZ (for if it is not
D(Q⋆‖PXZ) = +∞ and Q⋆ cannot be the minimizer).
Consequently, we can assume ∀n ∈ N, Q⋆n ≪ PXZ . Since
both D(Q‖PXZ) and f(Q‖PXZ) are continuous in Q over
the set of distributions Q that are absolutely continuous with
respect to PXZ ,
lim
n→∞
D(Q⋆n‖PXZ) + [R− f(Q
⋆
n‖PXZ)]
+
= D(Q⋆‖PXZ) + [R− f(Q
⋆‖PXZ)]
+ (155)
= Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R). (156)
Using (154) in the above yields,
Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R) ≥ lim
n→∞
Ei.i.d.s,n (PX ,W,R) (157)
which, together with (153) prove (152).
B. Proof of (ii)
1) Preliminaries: Let us first examine some properties of
the functions g and gn defined in (31b) and (27b) respectively.
To this end, it is more convenient to look at g and gn as
mappings from the joint distribution Q = P ×V ∈ P(X ×Z)
to R, namely,
g(Q,W ) ,
∑
x,z
Q(x, z) logW (z|x) +H(QZ)
+ min
Q′∈P(X×Z) :
Q′X=QX ,
Q′Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ), (158)
gn(Q,W ) ,
∑
x,z
Q(x, z) logW (z|x) +H(QZ)
+ min
Q′∈Pn(X×Z) :
Q′X=QX ,Q
′
Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ), (159)
Let us also define the sets Q ⊆ P(X ×Z) and Qn ⊆ Pn(X ×
Z) as
Q , {Q ∈ P(X × Z) : Q≪ QX ×W}. (160)
Qn , {Q ∈ Pn(X × Z) : Q≪ QX ×W}. (161)
(Note that Qn = Pn(X ×Z)∩Q.) The set Q is compact and
convex.
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Lemma 8. The function g(Q,W ) defined in (158) is contin-
uous in Q over the set of distributions Q ∈ Q.
Proof: The linear part ∑x,zQ(x, z) logW (z|x) is con-
tinuous in Q as long as Q(x, z) = 0 whenever W (z|x) = 0
(which is the case for Q ∈ Q). The entropy H(QZ) is also
continuous. It remains to prove the continuity of the last
minimization. We first note that
min
Q′∈P(X×Z) :
Q′X=QX ,
Q′Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ) = min
Q′∈Q :
Q′X=QX ,
Q′Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W )
(162)
(for if Q′ 6∈ Q, D(Q′‖Q′X × W ) = +∞ while Q′ = Q
is a feasible point for the minimization where the objective
functions has a finite value). The minimum in the above is
well-defined as Q is compact. Let
φ(Q) , min
Q′∈Q :
Q′X=QX ,Q
′
Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ). (163)
We prove that φ(Q) is convex in Q: Take two distributions
Q1 and Q2 in Q and let Q = λQ1 +λQ2 for some λ ∈ [0, 1]
(where we use the short-hand notation of λ = 1− λ). Let
Q⋆j , argmin
Q′∈Q:
Q′X=(Qj)X ,Q
′
Z=(Qj)Z
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ), j = 1, 2,
(164)
be the minimizers of (163). We, hence, have
λφ(Q1) + λφ(Q2)
= λD(Q⋆1‖(Q
⋆
1)X ×W ) + λD(Q
⋆
2‖(Q
⋆
2)X ×W ) (165)
(a)
≥ D(λQ⋆1 + λQ
⋆
2‖λ(Q
⋆
1)X ×W + λ(Q
⋆
2)X ×W ) (166)
(b)
≥ min
Q′∈Q:
Q′X=QX ,Q
′
Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ) = φ(Q). (167)
where (a) follows since KL divergence is convex in both
arguments [22, Lemma 3.5], and (b) follows since the joint
distribution λQ⋆1 + λQ⋆2 has x-marginal equal to QX and
z-marginal equal to QZ . The convexity of φ implies its
continuity in the interior of the set Q. The only discontinuity
points of φ could be at the boundaries of the set Q where it
may jump up. We prove that this cannot happen.
Let {Qn ∈ Q}n∈N be a sequence of distributions and Q =
limn→∞Qn be its limit point in Q. Let
Q⋆n , argmin
Q′∈Q:
Q′X=(Qn)X ,Q
′
Z=(Qn)Z
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ) (168)
and Q⋆ = limn→∞Q⋆n (by passing to a subsequence if
necessary). Since D(Q‖QX ×W ) is continuous in Q when
Q≪ QX ×W ,
lim
n→∞
φ(Qn) = D(Q
⋆‖Q⋆X ×W ). (169)
Moreover, since (Q⋆n)X = (Qn)X , by continuity of projection
we have Q⋆X = limn→∞(Q⋆n)X = limn→∞(Qn)X = QX .
Similarly, Q⋆Z = QZ . Thus,
lim
n→∞
φ(Qn) = D(Q
⋆‖Q⋆X ×W )
≥ min
Q′∈Q:
Q′X=QX ,
Q′Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ) = φ(Q), (170)
which shows φ(Q) cannot jump up, hence, ∀Q ∈ Q, is
continuous.
Remark. It can be checked that for a fixed P and W , the
function g(V ‖W |P ), defined in (31b), is convex in V .
Lemma 9. Let {Qn ∈ Qn}n∈N be a sequence of n-types and
Q = limn→∞Qn ∈ Q its limit point (note that since Qn ∈ Q
and Q is compact, by passing to a subsequence if necessary,
the limit exists). Then,
lim
n→∞
gn(Qn,W ) = g(Q,W ) (171)
(where gn(Qn,W ) and g(Q,W ) are defined in (158) and
(159) respectively).
Proof: Same considerations as in the proof of Lemma 8
shows that when Q ∈ Qn, the minimizing Q′ on the right-
hand-side of (159) must be in Qn. Define (for Q ∈ Qn),
φn(Q) , min
Q′∈Qn :
Q′X=QX ,Q
′
Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ). (172)
Since the linear term
∑
x,z Q(x, z) logW (z|x) (for Q ∈ Q)
and entropy H(QZ) are continuous, it is sufficient to prove
lim
n→∞
φn(Qn) = φ(Q) (173)
where φ(Q) is defined in (163). Since Qn ⊂ Q, we trivially
have φn(Qn) ≥ φ(Qn) and since φ is continuous (as shown
in Lemma 8), we have
lim
n→∞
φn(Qn) ≥ φ(Q). (174)
To prove the reverse inequality, let
Q⋆ , argmin
Q′∈Q:
Q′X=QX ,Q
′
Z=QZ
D(Q′‖Q′X ×W ). (175)
Since the union of n-types is dense in the simplex, there
exists a sequence of n-types {Q⋆n}n∈N such that ∀n ∈ N,
Q⋆n ≪ Q
⋆ and limn→∞ |Q⋆n −Q⋆| = 0, therefore φ(Q) =
limn→∞D(Q
⋆
n‖(Q
⋆
n)X ×W ). Moreover, it is easy to verify
that ∀n, Q⋆n ∈ Qn. Unfortunately, the x- and z-marginals
of Q⋆n are not necessarily equal to to (Qn)X and (Qn)Z
respectively. Therefore we cannot immediately lower-bound
D(Q⋆n‖(Q
⋆
n)X × W ) by φn(Qn) to conclude the proof.
However, since the marginals of Q⋆n are close to (Qn)X and
(Qn)Z , by perturbing Q⋆ns we can find a second sequence of
n-types, {Q⋆⋆n }n∈N such that
(a) (Q⋆⋆n )X = (Qn)X and (Q⋆⋆n )Z = (Qn)Z ;
(b) Q⋆⋆n ∈ Qn; and
(c) limn→∞ |Q⋆⋆n −Q⋆n| = 0.
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Accepting the existence of such a sequence {Q⋆⋆n }n∈N we will
have
φ(Q) = lim
n→∞
D(Q⋆n‖(Q
⋆
n)X ×W ) (176)
= lim
n→∞
D(Q⋆⋆n ‖(Q
⋆⋆
n )X ×W ) (177)
≥ lim
n→∞
φn(Qn) (178)
(where the last inequality follows since D(Q⋆⋆n ‖(Q⋆⋆n )X ×
W ) ≥ φn(Qn) as the x- and z-marginals of Q⋆⋆n are equal to
(Qn)X and (Qn)Z respectively). This will conclude the proof.
It remains to show the existence of the sequence {Q⋆⋆n }n∈N.
More precisely, we shall show that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n0(ǫ) such ∀n >
n0, we can find δ(x, z) : X × Z → R with the following
properties:
1) nδ(x, z) ∈ Z;
2) with
δX(x) , (Qn)X(x)− (Q
⋆
n)X(x), and (179)
δZ(z) , (Qn)Z(z)− (Q
⋆
n)Z(z), (180)
we have ∀x ∈ X ,
∑
z∈Z δ(x, z) = δX(x), and ∀z ∈ Z ,∑
x∈X δ(x, z) = δZ(z).
3) ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z , δ(x, z) + Q⋆n(x, z) ≥ 0 with equality
if Q⋆n(x, z) = 0;
4) |δ| ,∑x,z |δ(x, z)| ≤ ǫ.
(Note that δ(x, z) also depends on n but we do not show this
dependence explicitly to keep the notation simple.) If such δ
can be found, Q⋆⋆n (x, z) , Q⋆n(x, z) + δ(x, z) will be an n-
type (due to the first property) whose x- and z-marginals are
(Qn)X and (Qn)Z respectively (due to the second property)
and is absolutely continuous with respect to Q⋆n (due to the
third property) hence is in Qn and is at distance ǫ from Q⋆n
(due to the fourth property).
Pick any
γ < min
{2
5
min
(x,z)∈supp(Q⋆)
Q⋆(x, z),
ǫ
2|X ||Z|
}
. (181)
Then, ∃n0(γ) such that for ∀n > n0, |Q⋆n −Q⋆| ≤ γ/2 and
|Qn −Q| ≤ γ/2. Therefore, in particular,
|(Q⋆n)X −Q
⋆
X | = |(Q
⋆
n)X −QX | ≤ γ/2 (182)
and
|(Qn)X −QX | ≤ γ/2 (183)
which, together with the triangle inequality imply,
|(Q⋆n)X − (Qn)X | ≤ γ. (184)
Similarly,
|(Q⋆n)Z − (Qn)Z | ≤ γ. (185)
Let G be the “connectivity graph of the joint distribution
Q⋆n, namely the bipartite graph G = (X ,Z, E) where there
is an edge between x and z, (x, z) ∈ E , iff Q⋆n(x, z) > 0.
Suppose G is connected (we discuss what happens if this is
not the case later). Then, it certainly has a spanning tree. Let
T = (X ,Z, E ′), E ′ ⊆ E be one such tree, and pick any vertex
v ∈ X ∪ Z as the root. Suppose the tree has height H . Let
V = X ∪ Z be the set of all nodes of G and Vh denote the
set of vertices at height h in the tree. For every node v ∈ Vh,
let p(v) ∈ Vh−1 be the parent of v and K(v) = {u ∈ Vh+1 :
(v, u) ∈ E ′} be the children of v (with K(v) = ∅ for the
leaves). Consider the following algorithm to associate a value
δe to each edge of the tree:
1: for h = H to 1 do
2: for v ∈ Vh do
3: δe ← δ(v)−
∑
u∈K(v) δ(v,u)
4: end for
5: end for
where in line 3 we have used the generic notation
δ(v) =
{
δX(x), if v ∈ X ,
δZ(z), if v ∈ Z.
(186)
Finally, set
δ(x, z) =
{
δe if (x, z) ∈ E ′
0 otherwise.
(187)
δ : X × Z → R, as obtained above, satisfies all the desired
four properties:
1) is trivial: if (x, z) is not on the tree nδ(x, z) = 0,
otherwise δ(x, z) = δe, e = (x, z) and δe is the sum
of multiples of 1n thus is itself a multiple of
1
n .
2) holds by construction except for the root. Without loss of
generality suppose the root is a vertex x0 ∈ X . Then,∑
x,z
δ(x, z) =
∑
z
δZ(z) = 0. (188)
(since δZ is the difference of two distributions). There-
fore,
0 =
∑
z
δ(x0, z) +
∑
x 6=x0
∑
z
δ(x, z) (189)
=
∑
z
δ(x0, z) +
∑
x 6=x0
δX(x) (190)
which implies∑
z
δ(x0, z) = −
∑
x 6=x0
δX(x) = δX(x0) (191)
again since δX is the difference of two distributions.
Moreover by induction on T , we can prove that for every edge
e ∈ E ′,
δe ≤
∑
v∈Te
|δ(v)|, (192)
where Te is the sub-tree rooted at the highest vertex of
e. By extending the sum in (192) to the entire tree and
noting that
∑
x |δX(x)|+
∑
z |δZ(z)| = |(Q
⋆
n)X − (Qn)X |+
|(Q⋆n)Z − (Qn)Z | ≤ 2γ, we get the following weaker bound:
∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z ,
|δ(x, z)| ≤ 2γ, (193)
which implies the last two properties:
3) follows since δ(x, z) = 0 if Q⋆n(x, z) = 0 (as (x, z) 6∈
E ⊃ E ′) and
Q⋆n(x, z) + δ(x, z) ≥ Q
⋆
n(x, z)− 2γ (194)
≥ Q⋆(x, z)−
5
2
γ ≥ 0 (195)
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because of (181).
4) follows since
|δ| ≤ 2|X ||Z|γ ≤ ǫ (196)
(again because of (181)).
Disconnected G: Suppose for some n, G is not connected
and is rather union of two connected components (the proof
can be generalized to any finite number of components easily).
This means that we can partition X and Z into two subsets as
X = X1 ∪ X2, X1 ∩ X2 = ∅ and Z = Z1 ∪ Z2, Z1 ∩ Z2 = ∅
where E = supp(Q⋆n) ⊆ (X1 ×Z1) ∪ (X2 ×Z2).
This, together with the choice of γ in (181) implies
supp(Q⋆) ⊆ (X1 × Z1) ∪ (X2 × Z2) and hence, ∀n,
supp(Q⋆n) ⊆ (X1 ×Z1) ∪ (X2 ×Z2).
For ∀n ∈ N, let
λn ,
∑
(x,z)∈X1×Z1
Q⋆n(x, z) = 1−
∑
(x,z)∈X2×Z2
Q⋆n(x, z).
(197)
Note that nλn is an integer and by assumption limn→∞ λn =
Q⋆X(X1) = QX(X1) > 0 (if this is not the case we should have
started with a smaller X ) thus limn→∞ nλn = ∞. Similarly,
we conclude that n(1−λn) is an integer-valued sequence that
goes to infinity as n grows.
Let
Q⋆n
′(x, z) ,
Q⋆n(x, z)
λn
1{(x, z) ∈ X1 ×Z1} and (198)
Q⋆n
′′(x, z) ,
Q⋆n(x, z)
λn
1{(x, z) ∈ X2 ×Z2}, (199)
(where we have used the shorthand notation λn = 1−λn) and
observe that
D(Q⋆n‖(Q
⋆
n)X ×W )
= λnD
(
Q⋆n
′‖(Q⋆n
′)X ×W
)
+ λnD
(
Q⋆n
′′‖(Q⋆n
′′)X ×W
)
.
(200)
Note that Q⋆n
′ (resp. Q⋆n′′) is an nλn-type (resp. nλn-type).
Define also
Q′n(x, z) ,
Qn(x, z)
λn
1{(x, z) ∈ X1 ×Z1} and (201)
Q′′n(x, z) ,
Qn(x, z)
λn
1{(x, z) ∈ X2 ×Z2}, (202)
and note that Q′n (resp. Q′′n) is also an nλn-type (resp. an
nλn-type).
Our argument for connected G shows that there ex-
ists a sequence of nλn-types {Q⋆⋆n
′ ∈ Qnλn}n∈N such
that ∀n, (Q⋆⋆n
′)X = (Q
′
n)X , (Q
⋆⋆
n
′)Z = (Q
′
n)Z and
limn→∞ |Q⋆⋆n
′ −Q⋆n
′| = 0. Similarly, there exists a sequence
of nλn-types {Q⋆⋆n
′′ ∈ Qnλn}n∈N such that ∀n, (Q
⋆⋆
n
′′)X =
(Q′′n)X , (Q
⋆⋆
n
′′)Z = (Q
′′
n)Z and limn→∞ |Q⋆⋆n
′′ −Q⋆n
′′| = 0.
Therefore,
D(Q⋆‖Q⋆X ×W ) = limn→∞
D(Q⋆n‖(Q
⋆
n)X ×W ) (203)
= lim
n→∞
{
λnD
(
Q⋆n
′‖(Q⋆n
′)X ×W
)
+ λnD
(
Q⋆n
′′‖(Q⋆n
′′)X ×W
)} (204)
= lim
n→∞
{
λnD
(
Q⋆⋆n
′‖(Q⋆⋆n
′)X ×W
)
+ λnD
(
Q⋆⋆n
′′‖(Q⋆⋆n
′′)X ×W
)} (205)
≥ lim
n→∞
{
λnφnλn(Q
′
n) + λnφnλn(Q
′′
n)
}
. (206)
Moreover, using the same reasoning as we had to prove
convexity of φ (see (167)) it follows that
λnφnλn(Q
′
n)+λnφnλn(Q
′′
n) ≥ φn
(
λnQ
′
n+λnQ
′′
n
)
= φ(Qn).
(207)
Therefore, continuing (206), we will again have
φ(Q) = D(Q⋆‖Q⋆X ×W ) ≥ limn→∞
φn(Qn) (208)
which concludes the proof.
2) Proof of (30): Now we are ready to prove (30). We need
to show that
lim
n→∞
Ec.c.s,n (Pn,W,R) = E
c.c.
s (PX ,W,R) (209)
for any sequence of n-types, Pn ∈ Pn(X ) that converge to
PX . Let
V˜n , argmin
V : X→Z:
PX×V ∈Pn(X×Z)
{
D(V ‖W |Pn)+[R−gn(V ‖W |Pn)]
+
}
(210)
and (by passing to a subsequence if necessary) V˜ ,
limn→∞ V˜n. We know that Pn × Vn ≪ Pn × W , thus, by
the continuity of divergence and (171),
lim
n→∞
Ec.c.s,n (Pn,W,R)
= D(V˜ ‖W |PX) + [R− g(V˜ ‖W |PX)]
+ (211)
≥ min
V :X→Z
{
D(V ‖W |PX) + [R− g(V ‖W |PX)]
+
} (212)
= Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R). (213)
On the other side, let
V ⋆ = argmin
V :X→Z
{D(V ‖W |PX)+[R−g(V ‖W |PX)]
+}. (214)
There exists a sequence of stochastic matrices V ⋆n :
X → Z such that, (a) Pn × V ⋆n ∈ Pn(X × Z), (b)
limn→∞ |Pn × V ⋆n − PX × V
⋆| = 0, and (c) ∀n, Pn ×
V ⋆n ≪ Pn × W . Accepting this momentarily, by continuity
of D(V ‖W |P ) and (171), we have
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R)
= lim
n→∞
{
D
(
V ⋆n ‖W |Pn
)
+
[
R− gn
(
V ⋆n ‖W |Pn
)]+}
(215)
≥ lim
n→∞
Ec.c.n,s (Pn,W,R) (216)
which, together with (213) yields (209).
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Existence of such V ⋆n s already follows from the algorithm
we presented in the proof of Lemma 9 or more simply from
the following argument: We assumed (without essential loss
of generality) that supp(PX) = X . Therefore, the assumption
limn→∞ |Pn − PX | = 0, implies ∀x ∈ X , limn→∞ Pn(x) =
PX(x) > 0, thus limn→∞ nPn(x) = +∞. Pick ǫ > 0.
Therefore ∃n0(ǫ) such that ∀n > n0, |PX − Pn| ≤ ǫ/2.
Moreover, for each x, V ⋆(·|x) is the limit point of a sequence
of n-types on supp
(
V ⋆(·|x)
)
. Therefore, for every x ∈ X ,
∃nx(ǫ) such that for ∀n > nx, there exists an nPn(x)-type
V ⋆n (·|x) such that |V ⋆(·|x)− V ⋆n (·|x)| ≤ ǫ/2 and V ⋆n (·|x) ≪
V ⋆(·|x). Finally, we observe that Pn×V ⋆n is a n-type and for
n > max
{
n0,maxx∈X nx
}
, |Pn × V
⋆
n − PX × V
⋆| ≤ ǫ.
C. Strict Monotonicity of Ei.i.d.s and Ec.c.s in R
That Ei.i.d.s is strictly increasing in R for R > I(PX ,W )
can be easily seen through the form of (32): Ei.i.d.s is the supre-
mum of affine functions of R thus is convex in R. On the other
side, since F0(PX ,W, λ) is a convex function of λ passing
through the origin with slope I(PX ,W ), Ei.i.d.s (PX ,W,R)
starts to increase above 0 once R exceeds I(PX ,W ) which
means it will be strictly increasing for R > I(PX ,W ).
We only need to prove the claim for Ec.c.s . (This proof
may also be used to show Ei.i.d.s is strictly increasing in R,
replacing g with f .) Note that
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) = min
{
min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≥R
D(V ‖W |PX),
min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX) +R− g(V ‖W |PX)}
}
.
(217)
We first show that for R > I(PX ,W ),
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R)
= min
V :g(V ‖W |PX)≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX) +R− g(V ‖W |PX)}
(218)
= R+ min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX)− g(V ‖W |PX)}
(219)
This follows since for R > I(PX ,W ),
min
V :g(V ‖W |PX)≥R
D(V ‖W |PX)
= min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )=R
D(V ‖W |PX) (220)
Let us first prove (220): Suppose this is not the case, i.e., there
exists V ⋆ with g(V ⋆‖W |PX) > R such that D(V ⋆‖W |PX) ≤
D(V ‖W |PX) for every V with g(V ‖W |PX) ≥ R. We
can safely assume that PX × V ⋆ ≪ PX × W (otherwise
D(V ‖W |PX) = +∞ for all V such that g(V ‖W |PX) ≥ R
and (219) automatically follows). Let Vλ , λV ⋆+(1−λ)W ,
for λ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to check that ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] : PX ×Vλ ≪
PX ×W , thus the mapping λ 7→ g(Vλ‖W |PX) is continuous
by the continuity of g (see Lemma 8) on the interval [0, 1].
We know that g(V1‖W |PX) = g(V⋆‖W |PX) > R and
g(V0‖W |PX) = g(W‖W |PX) = I(PX ,W ) < R. Therefore,
there exists β ∈ (0, 1) for which g(Vβ‖W |PX) = R. On the
other side, the convexity of divergence implies
D(Vβ‖W |PX) ≤ βD(V
⋆‖W |PX) + (1− β)D(W‖W |PX)
(221)
< D(V ⋆‖W |PX) (222)
since β < 1. This contradicts the optimality of V ⋆.
Now, we show that Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R′) > Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R)
for R′ > R > I(PX ,W ). Let
V ∗ = argmin
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R′
{D(V ‖W |PX)− g(V ‖W |PX)}.
(223)
If g(V ∗‖W |PX) ≤ R, then
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R
′) = R′ +D(V ∗‖W |PX)− g(V
∗‖W |PX)
(224)
= R′ + min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX)− g(V ‖W |PX)}
(225)
> R + min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX)− g(V ‖W |PX)}
(226)
= Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) (227)
which proves the claim.
Otherwise, we have R < g(V ∗‖W |PX) ≤ R′. Consider
once again the family of stochastic matrices defined as Vλ ,
λV ∗ + (1 − λ)W . We know PX × V ∗ ≪ PX ×W (for if
it is not, D(V ∗‖W |PX) = +∞ and g(V ∗‖W |PX) = −∞
which means the exponent is infinity which is contradic-
tion since Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R′) ≤ R′ − I(PX ,W ) by taking
V = W in (219)). Using the same reasoning as above, since
g(V1‖W |PX) > R and g(V0‖W |PX) = I(PX ,W ) < R one
can find β ∈ (0, 1) such that g(Vβ‖W |PX) = R and
D(Vβ‖W |PX) ≤ βD(V
⋆‖W |PX). (228)
Moreover, we know that
D(Vβ‖W |PX) = R+ [D(Vβ‖W |PX)− g(Vβ‖W |PX)]
(229)
≥ R+ min
V :g(V ‖W |PX )≤R
{D(V ‖W |PX)− g(V ‖W |PX)}
(230)
= Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R). (231)
One the other side,
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R
′) = R′ +D(V ∗‖W |PX)− g(V
∗‖W |PX)
(232)
(a)
≥ D(V ∗‖W |PX) (233)
(b)
≥
1
β
D(Vβ‖W |PX) (234)
(c)
≥
1
β
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) (235)
(d)
> Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R), (236)
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where (a) follows since g(V ⋆‖W |PX) ≤ R′, (b) follows from
(228) and (c) from (231) and finally (d) holds since β < 1
and Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R) > 0.
D. Alternative form of Ei.i.d.s
Let PXZ = PX×W again. Using the fact that max{a, 0} =
max0≤λ≤1 λa,
min
Q
{
D(Q‖PXZ) + [R− f(Q‖PXZ)]
+
}
= min
Q
{
D(Q‖PXZ) + max
0≤λ≤1
λ[R − f(Q‖PXZ)]
}
(237)
= min
Q
max
0≤λ≤1
{λR +D(Q‖PXZ)− λf(Q‖PXZ)} (238)
(a)
= max
0≤λ≤1
min
Q
{λR +D(Q‖PXZ)− λf(Q‖PXZ)} (239)
= max
0≤λ≤1
{
λR+min
Q
{D(Q‖PXZ)− λf(Q‖PXZ)}
}
(240)
(b)
= max
0≤λ≤1
{λR − F0(PX ,W, λ)} (241)
where (a) follows since D(Q‖PXZ)−λf(Q‖PXZ) is convex
in Q (recall that f is linear in Q) and (b) since
D(Q‖PXZ)− λf(Q‖PXZ)
=
∑
x,z
Q(x, z) log
Q(x, z)
PXZ(x, z)1+λPX(x)−λPZ(z)−λ
(242)
(∗)
≥ − log
∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z)
1+λPX(x)
−λPZ(z)
−λ (243)
= F0(PX ,W, λ), (244)
with equality in (∗) iff Q(x, z) ∝
PXZ(x, z)
1+λPX(x)
−λPZ(z)
−λ
.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (34)
Taking V ′ = V in (31b), we have g(V ‖W |P ) ≤ I(P, V ),
thus,
R− g(V ‖W |PX) ≥ R− I(PX , V ). (245)
Therefore,
Ec.c.s (PX ,W,R)
= min
V
{
D(V ‖W |PX) + [R− g(V ‖W |PX)]
+
} (246)
≥ min
V
{
D(V ‖W |PX) + [R− I(PX , V )]
+
} (247)
(a)
= min
V
{
D(V ‖W |PX) + max
0≤λ≤1
{λR− λI(PX , V )}
}
(248)
(b)
= max
0≤λ≤1
{
λR +min
V
{D(V ‖W |PX)− λI(PX , V )}
}
(249)
where (a) follows since [a]+ = max0≤λ≤1 λa and (b) by
observing that D(V ‖W |PX)−λI(PX , V ) is convex in V for
λ ≤ 1 (and linear in λ). The latter holds since I(PX , V ) =
minQZ∈P(Z)D(V ‖QZ|PX), therefore,
D(V ‖W |PX)− λI(PX , V )
= max
QZ∈P(Z)
{D(V ‖W |PX)− λD(V ‖QZ |PX)} (250)
= max
QZ
∑
x,z
PX(x)V (z|x) log
V (z|x)1−λ
W (z|x)QZ(z)−λ
(251)
=
1
t
max
QZ
∑
x,z
PX(x)V (z|x) log
V (z|x)
W (z|x)tQZ(z)1−t
. (252)
where we have defined t , 11−λ in the last step. The objective
function inside the max in (252) is convex in V and since the
supremum of convex functions is still convex, the convexity
of D(V ‖W |PX) − λI(PX , V ) in V follows. It can also be
seen that the objective function is concave in QZ for λ > 0
(i.e. t > 1). Using this observation we have
min
V
{D(V ‖W |PX)− λI(PX , V )}
=
1
t
min
V
max
QZ
∑
x,z
PX(x)V (z|x) log
V (z|x)
W (z|x)tQZ(z)1−t
(253)
=
1
t
max
QZ
min
V
∑
x,z
PX(x)V (z|x) log
V (z|x)
W (z|x)tQZ(z)1−t
(254)
(a)
= max
QZ
{
−
1
t
∑
x
PX(x) log
∑
z
W (z|x)tQZ(z)
1−t
}
(255)
(b)
≥ max
QZ
{
−
1
t
log
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
z
W (z|x)tQZ(z)
1−t
}
(256)
= −min
QZ
{
1
t
log
∑
z
QZ(z)
1−t
∑
x
PX(x)W (z|x)
t
}
(257)
where (a) and (b) follow by the concavity of logarithm. KKT
conditions imply the solution to the minimization of (257) is
QZ(z) = c
(∑
x
PX(x)W (z|x)
t
)1/t
(258)
with c−1 =
∑
z (
∑
x PX(x)W (z|x)
t)
1/t
. Plugging this into
the objective function of (257) and replacing t = 11−λ , we
have
min
V
{D(V ‖W |PX)− λI(PX , V )}
= − log
∑
z
(∑
x
PX(x)W (z|x)
1
1−λ
)1−λ
(259)
= −E0(PX ,W, λ). (260)
Plugging (260) into (249) proves the claim.
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APPENDIX D
NUMERICAL EVALUATION OF THE SECRECY EXPONENTS
A. Computing Ei.i.d.s and Ec.c.s
Both Ei.i.d.s and Ec.c.s can be easily evaluated via the
expressions (32) and (33) using the fact that both F0 and E0
(defined in (32b) and (33b) respectively) are convex in λ, and
pass through the origin with slope I(PX ,W ).
For instance to evaluate Ei.i.d.s we know that
1) for R ≤ I(PX ,W ) = ∂∂λF0(PX ,W, λ)
∣∣
λ=0
,
Es(PX ,W,R) = 0;
2) for I(PX ,W ) < R < ∂∂λF0(PX ,W, λ)
∣∣
λ=1
, the pairs R,
Ei.i.d.s are related parametrically as
R(λ) =
∂
∂λ
F0(PX ,W, λ) (261a)
Es(λ) = λR(λ)− F0(PX ,W, λ) (261b)
for the range of λ ∈ [0, 1];
3) finally, if R ≥ F ′0(1),
Es(PX ,W,R) = R− F0(PX ,W, 1). (262)
It is clear that to evaluate Ec.c.s , one has to follow precisely
the same steps replacing F0 with E0.
B. Computing Ec.c.s
To compute Ec.c.s (defined in (31)), one has to solve two
minimizations. Namely, that of (31a) and that of (31b). The
latter turns out to be efficiently solvable using standard convex
optimization tools.
Fix QZ ∈ P(Z) (to be set to PX ◦ V to compute
g(V ‖W |PX)). We have:
min
V ′:PX◦V ′=QZ
D(V ′‖W |PX) = min
V ′
{
D(V ′‖W |PX)
+ max
ρ∈R|Z|
∑
z
ρz [QZ(z)− (PX ◦ V
′)(z)]
}
(263)
= max
ρ∈R|Z|
{
min
V ′
{
D(V ′‖W |PX)−
∑
x,z
PX(x)V
′(z|x)ρz
}
+
∑
z
ρzQZ(z)
}
, (264)
where ρ , (ρ1, . . . , ρ|Z|) and the last equality follows since
D(V ‖W |PX) is convex in V and the second term is linear
in V . Moreover, the inner unconstrained minimization has the
value
min
V ′
{
D(V ′‖W |PX)−
∑
x,z
PX(x)V
′(z|x)ρz
}
= min
V ′
∑
x,z
PX(x)V
′(z|x) log
V ′(z|x)
W (z|x) exp(ρz)
(265)
= −
∑
x
PX(x) log
∑
z
W (z|x) exp(ρz), (266)
by choosing V ′(z|x) ∝ W (z|x) exp(ρz). Plugging this into
(264), we get
min
V ′:PX◦V ′=Q
D(V ′‖W |PX) = max
ρ∈R|Z|
{∑
z
ρzQZ(z)
−
∑
x
PX(x) log
∑
z
W (z|x) exp(ρz)
}
. (267)
Remark. Using Ho¨lder’s inequality, it can be checked that
the objective function of (267) is concave in ρ, thus can be
efficiently maximized using standard numerical methods.
Proof: Since the first sum in the objective function of
(267) is linear in ρ it is sufficient to prove that the function
ρ 7→
∑
x
PX(x) log (W (z|x) exp(ρz)) (268)
is convex in ρ. Fix t ∈ [0, 1] and ρ, ρ′ ∈ R|Z|. For every
x ∈ X , Ho¨lder’s inequality implies∑
z
W (z|x) exp(tρz + (1− t)ρ
′
z)
=
∑
z
W (z|x)t exp(tρz) ·W (z|x)
1−t exp((1− t)ρ′z)
(269)
≤
(∑
z
W (z|x) exp(ρz)
)t
·
(∑
x
W (z|x) exp(ρ′z)
)1−t
(270)
Taking the logarithm of both sides, multiplying by PX(x), and
finally summing over x proves the claim.
Finally, for small alphabet sizes that we have considered
in Section IV-B, we can solve the minimization of (31a) via
exhaustive search.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
(i) The linearity of expectation shows that P¯Zn as defined
in (12) is the expectation of the non-negative random
variable PCn(zn) (defined in (8)). Therefore, P¯Zn(zn) =
0 implies PCn(zn) = 0 almost surely.
(ii) Pick zn and z˜n that have the same type. Therefore, there
exists a permutation, call it π : Zn → Zn, such that
z˜n = π(zn) and zn = π−1(z˜n). Then,
P¯Zn(z˜
n) =
∑
xn
PXn(x
n)Wn(z˜n|xn) (271)
(a)
=
∑
x˜n
PXn
(
π(x˜n)
)
Wn
(
π(zn)|π(x˜n)
) (272)
(b)
=
∑
x˜n
PXn(x˜
n)Wn(zn|x˜n) = P¯Zn(z
n).
(273)
where in (a) we have taken xn = π(x˜n) and (b) follows
since PXn(xn) only depends on the type of xn (and
by construction x˜n and π(x˜n) have the same type) and
similarly Wn
(
π(zn)|π(x˜n)
)
= Wn(zn|x˜n).
(iii) We have
P¯Zn(z
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
PXn(x
n)Wn(zn|xn) (274)
P¯Zn(z
n) > 0 implies there exists at least one sequence
xn0 ∈ supp(PXn) for which Wn(zn|xn0 ) > 0. Therefore,
Wn(zn|xn0 ) > W
n
min. Thus (274) yields
P¯Zn(z
n) ≥ PXn(x
n
0 )W
n
min. (275)
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For i.i.d. random coding ensemble, PXn(xn) =
PnX(x
n) ≥ Pnmin and for the constant-composition ran-
dom coding ensemble, PXn(xn) = 1/
∣∣T nPX ∣∣ ≥ (1/|X |)n(since T nPX ⊆ Xn).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Take U , A
E[A] so that E[U ] = 1. We shall prove that
c(θ) (var(U)− τθ(U)) ≤ E[U ln(U)] ≤ var(U). (276)
The claim then follows by noting that E[A ln(A/E[A])] =
E[A] E[U ln(U)] and var(A) = var(U)/(E[A])2.
We first have
E[U ln(U)] = E[U ln(U)− (U − 1)] (277)
≤ E[(U − 1)2] = var(U), (278)
since u ln(u)− (u− 1) ≤ (u− 1)2. On the other hand,
u ln(u)− (u− 1) ≥ c(θ)(u − 1)21{u ≤ θ + 1}. (279)
This follows by observing that u ln(u)−(u−1)(u−1)2 is a decreasing
function of u (see Lemma 10 below). Thus,
E[U ln(U)] ≥ c(θ)
∫ θ+1
0
(u− 1)2dFU (u). (280)
where FU (u) is the cumulative distribution function of u.
Furthermore,∫ θ+1
0
(u− 1)2dFU (u) = var(U)−
∫ +∞
θ+1
(u − 1)2dFU (u)
(281)
Let v , u−1 for the sake of brevity and denote by F¯V (v) ,
Pr{V > v} = Pr{U > v+1} the complementary distribution
function of V . Then,∫ +∞
θ+1
(u− 1)2dFU (u) =
∫ +∞
θ
v2dFV (v) (282)
=
[
−v2F¯V (v)
]+∞
θ
+ 2
∫ +∞
θ
vF¯V (v)dv (283)
(∗)
= θ2F¯V (θ) + 2
∫ +∞
θ
vF¯V (v)dv. (284)
The equality in (∗) follows since we assumed the variance of
U exists. This proves (276).
Lemma 10. For t ≥ 0,
(i) the mapping t 7→ t ln(t)−(t−1)t−1 is increasing in t;
(ii) the mapping t 7→ t ln(t)−(t−1)(t−1)2 is decreasing in t.
Proof:
(i)
∂
∂t
{ t ln(t)− (t− 1)
t− 1
}
=
(t− 1)− ln(t)
(t− 1)2
≥ 0 (285)
since ln(t) ≤ t− 1.
(ii)
∂
∂t
{ t ln(t)− (t− 1)
(t− 1)2
}
=
2(t− 1)− (t+ 1) ln(t)
(t− 1)3
≤ 0,
(286)
since for t ≥ 1, ln(t) ≥ 2 t−1t+1 while for t ≤ 1, ln(t) ≤
2 t−1t+1 . The latter follows since ln(t) − 2
t−1
t+1 equals 0 at
t = 1 and has derivative
(t− 1)2
t(t+ 1)2
≥ 0.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF (48)
We have
pQ(z
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
1{(xn, zn) ∈ T nQ }PXn(x
n) (287)
=
PXn(T nQX )
|T nQX |
∑
xn∈Xn
1{(xn, zn) ∈ T nQ } (288)
since PXn(xn) only depends on the type of xn. On the other
side, we have
|T nQ | =
∑
zn∈Zn
∑
xn∈Xn
1
{
(xn, zn) ∈ T nQ
} (289)
The value of the inner sum in (289) only depends on the
type of zn (this can be easily checked using the same type
of argument as we had in Appendix E part (ii)) and, clearly,
is zero if QZ 6= Qˆzn . Thus
|T nQ | = |T
n
QZ |1{QZ = Qˆzn}
∑
xn∈Xn
1
{
(xn, zn) ∈ T nQ
}
.
(290)
Plugging (290) into (288) yields (48).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF (55)
We only prove (55a) (as (55b) is trivial). (We omit the
dependence on zn throughout the proof for notational brevity.)
var(L1) =
∑
Q∈Q′n
1
M2
ℓ(Q)2 var(NQ)
+
∑
(Q1,Q2)∈Q
′
n
2
Q1 6=Q2
1
M2
ℓ(Q1)ℓ(Q2) cov(NQ1 , NQ2) (291)
(⋆)
=
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2pQ(1− pQ)
−
1
M
∑
(Q1,Q2)∈Q
′
n
2
Q1 6=Q2
ℓ(Q1)ℓ(Q2)pQ1pQ2 , (292)
where (⋆) follows since var(NQ) = MpQ(1 − pQ) and
cov(NQ1 , NQ2) = −MpQ1pQ2 . Moreover,∑
(Q1,Q2)∈Q
′
n
2
Q1 6=Q2
ℓ(Q1)ℓ(Q2)pQ1pQ2
=
∑
Q1∈Q′n
ℓ(Q1)pQ1
∑
Q2∈Q′n\{Q1}
ℓ(Q2)pQ2 (293)
=
∑
Q1∈Q′n
ℓ(Q1)pQ1
(
E[L1]− pQ1ℓ(Q1)
)
. (294)
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Using the above in (292) we get,
var(L1)
=
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)pQ
[
(1− pQ)ℓ(Q)−
(
E[L1]− pQℓ(Q)
)]
(295)
=
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)pQ
[
ℓ(Q)− E[L1]
] (296)
=
1
M
∑
Q∈Q′n
ℓ(Q)2pQ −
1
M
E[L1]
2.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF (121)
Equation (119) immediately implies
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] ≤˙
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (297)
It remains to show
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] ≥˙
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
, (298)
to establish (121).
Equation (119) means there exists a sub-exponentially in-
creasing sequence β(n) (which depends only on |X | and |Z|)
such that
β(n)
[
E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)] +
log(e)
M
]
≥
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(Q‖QX ×W )
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (299)
Since the union of n-types is dense in P(X × Z), for
large enough n, there exists an n-type that is as close
as desired to the joint distribution PX × W . More pre-
cisely, for every ǫ > 0, there exists n0(ǫ) such that
∀n > n0(ǫ), there exists Qn ∈ Pn(X × Z) for which
I(Qn) ≥ I(PX ,W ) − ǫ, D(Qn‖(Qn)X × W ) ≤ ǫ/2 and
PXn
(
T n(Qn)X
)
> exp(−nǫ/2). Indeed, taking Qn = Pn×Wn,
where Pn is an n-type quantization of PX for the i.i.d. random
coding ensemble and Wn is the quantization of W such that
Wn(·|x) is a nPn(x)-type yields all desired properties.
Note also that
ℓ(Q) ≥ exp
(
nω(Q)
)∣∣T nQZ ∣∣ (300)
(∗)
≥ (n+ 1)−|Z| exp(n[ω(Q) +H(QZ)]) (301)
= (n+ 1)−|Z| exp
(
n[I(Q)−D(Q‖QX ×W )]
)
, (302)
where (∗) follows from [22, Lemma 2.3]. Let
ǫ , min{R/2, I(PX ,W )/4} > 0 (303)
and observe that for all n ≥ n0(ǫ) with Qn as described above
ℓ(Qn) ≥ (n+ 1)
−|Z| exp{n(I(PX ,W )− 2ǫ)}. (304)
Consequently, the term corresponding to Q = Qn in the
summation of (299) is lower-bounded as
exp
(
−nD(Wn‖W |Pn)
)
PXn
(
T nPn
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Qn)
M
}
≥ (n+ 1)−|Z| exp{−n(ǫ+ [R− I(PX ,W ) + 2ǫ]
+)}
(305)
≥ (n+ 1)−|Z| exp{−n(R− ǫ)}. (306)
The last inequality follows because of the choice of ǫ in (303).
Obviously, ∃n1(ǫ, |X |, |Z|) such that ∀n ≥ n1,
β(n)
log(e)
M
= β(n) log(e) exp(−nR)
≤
1
2
(n+ 1)−|Z| exp
(
−n(R− ǫ)
)
. (307)
This, together with (306) implies for n ≥ n2 , max{n0, n1},
β(n)
log(e)
M
≤
1
2
exp
(
−nD(Wn‖W |Pn)
)
PXn
(
T nPn
)
×min
{
1,
ℓ(Qn)
M
}
. (308)
Using (308) in (298) (and multiplying the summands corre-
sponding to Q 6= Qn by 12 ) we conclude that for n ≥ n2,
β(n)E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
≥
1
2
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(QZ|X‖W |QX)
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (309)
Take
β′(n) ,
{
+∞ if n < n2
2β(n) otherwise.
(310)
Therefore, ∀n,
β′(n)E[D(PCn‖P¯Zn)]
≥
∑
Q∈Pn(X×Z)
exp
{
−nD(QZ|X‖W |QX)
}
× PXn
(
T nQX
)
min
{
1,
ℓ(Q)
M
}
. (311)
We finally have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log β′(n) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log β(n) = 0 (312)
by assumption and that β′ only depends on |X |, |Z|, R,
PX , and W (because n2 only depends on these parameters).
Therefore, (311) establishes (298) and concludes the proof.
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